The current proliferation of political gangsters, paramilitary groups and vigilantes in Indonesia reflects the inability of the state to ensure security and maintain public order. This paper, published by the Asia Research Centre, analyses the recent democratisation of violence in Indonesia that is driven by paramilitary groups attached to political parties. Response to such organised violence requires that Indonesia undertake a re-configuration of the state that includes efforts to address deep-rooted social and economic causes of violence.
The emergence in 1998 of the Pamswakarsa, a state-sponsored civilian guard, reflected the state’s recognition that it could no longer legitimate violent suppression of dissent. This security proxy group of 30,000 engaged in a high level of public violence that led to its disbanding.
However, state sponsorship of the Pamswakarsa led to the establishment of dozens of paramilitary forces by political parties, religious and civil organisations. These forces recruit membership from the urban poor and foster extortion, suppression of opponents and public violence. They reflect the ethos of the traditional Indonesian preman, who displays, in contemporary terms, the tactics of a gangster.
Two vigilante groups, the Betawi Brotherhood Forum (FBR) and Defenders of Islam Front (FPI), illustrate the following impact of vigilante groups in Indonesia:
- The FBR has 10,000 members and represents politically-marginalised Betawi. It controls the informal sector in East Jakarta through violence and extortion.
- FBR’s security arm, the gardu, organised ostensibly to fill the security void left by police, operates neighbourhood patrols and organises various cultural services. According to FBR, crime rates have dropped since the institution of the gardu.
- While claiming political neutrality, FBR has been accused of forging alliances with Jakarta’s governor and police. It engages in violence against perceived opponents.
- Attracting urban poor youth, the FPI focuses on vigilante actions, religious instruction and martial arts training.
- FPI insists that the state institutionalise Muslim Shari´a law. Under the edict of leading people towards good and away from evil, it has attacked Jakarta’s nightlife establishments. Police/FPI relations are increasingly tense.
- September 11 generated more aggressive FPI mobilisation. The 2002 Bali bombing resulted in the end of the government’s tolerance of militant Islamic groups. However, after the 2004 tsunami, FPI allegedly began to organise extortion rackets and siphon aid supplies in Aceh.
Analysis of the rise of Indonesian vigilante groups, criminals and preman prompts the following observations:
- Paramilitary groups are a major challenge to restoring confidence in Indonesia’s state institutions.
- On its present trajectory, Indonesia is heading towards a preman state similar to Russia, where criminals and thugs have helped reduce the state to functional disarray.
- Indonesia needs to undertake a comprehensive re-configuration of the state that includes addressing deep-rooted social and economic causes of violence.
- Further research should focus on informal constellations of power and their ramifications for the ongoing process of statebuilding in Indonesia.
