What can theories of state formation contribute to approaches to security sector reform (SSR) and state-building? This article from Conflict, Security and Development examines SSR using theories of the state and state formation within an historical-philosophical perspective. It cautions against having too high expectations of the ability of SSR to create states that are both stable and democratic and accountable. Instead we should carefully determine what level of ambition is realistic for each specific project depending on local circumstances.
SSR aims to transform the structures of the state, (civil) society and the polity. An understanding of the historical processes and theories of state formation is therefore important if SSR is to be carried out effectively. State formation theory suggests that to transform the state in a partner country, SSR must create a political community in that country. It also demonstrates that the key elements of modern countries – state, (civil) society and polity – emerged in sequence. Attempting to achieve increased state control, legitimate government, civil society engagement and democratisation at the same time will therefore be highly difficult.
The mixed results of SSR programmes demonstrate the importance of recognising what kinds of structures of state, polity and society are present in a country. Success and failure in past SSR and state-building operations are better explained by the target country’s level of ‘stateness’ at the onset of operations than by the resources and strategies applied in the operations. In Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) which effectively conformed to Western patterns of state, society and polity, SSR was successful. In the Central Asian successor countries of the Soviet Union and in Sierra Leone, structures of state, polity and society do not conform to the European type. In these countries SSR was less successful. From these case studies, it can be concluded that:
- The existence of formal statehood, which all the cases share, does not guarantee SSR success. Instead, one must examine the kind of state structures as well as how deep-seated they are in order to understand the preconditions of SSR success.
- The strength of state control may be a less important precondition for SSR success than its capacity to penetrate society.
- Awareness that the key elements of modern countries developed in sequence highlights that SSR activities in CEECs commenced with state, polity and society in place. In Central Asia, however, only weak states were present.
Processes such as state transformation do not follow linear trajectories of cause and effect, making it difficult to establish causal connections between inputs and outcomes. The concept and practice of SSR cannot therefore be amended simply by adding greater contextual understanding. Instead, SSR requires greater realism and pragmatism, with realistic levels of ambition for specific projects depending on local circumstances. The article argues that SSR activities in post-conflict settings and failed states are more usefully better understood as state-building operations. Further policy implications include the following:
- Increasing the role of taxation in government finances could begin to entwine elites in a political community and create popular demand for state structures. The absence of such demand in many parts of the world is a glaring problem for SSR.
- Programmes must be extremely long-term if they are to achieve ambitious goals where structures of polity, state and society are weak, recent or non-existent.
- It is important to be attentive to different forms of state and particular differences between the state in the European tradition and elsewhere.
- Collaboration between political scientists, historians and anthropologists could increase knowledge of countries that do not conform to European patterns of state, society and polity.
