Why is it difficult to turn security sector reform (SSR) policy into reality? This chapter from Security Sector Reform in Challenging Environments examines progress in implementing SSR in Timor-Leste. The concept remains hard to explain and has struggled to find a place within existing institutional structures. SSR is still approached as a dry, mechanical exercise without accounting for complexities of politics, history and languages.
Following Timorese independence in 2002, a number of uniformed institutions collectively known as the security sector were created. The establishment of each institution took place quickly without much of a policy framework. UN presence wound down in 2005, with a sense that Timor-Leste was a success story. But in 2006 large parts of the Timorese security institutions collapsed and the nation moved towards civil war. The police and military were incapable of controlling, and at times complicit in, crime and lawlessness.
In response to the 2006 crisis, the UN Security Council authorised a new mission which included policing and support to a government-led security sector review. Bilateral donors began new programmes or strengthened existing ones and Australia provided military peacekeeping.
- Timor-Leste represents the first time the UN has attempted to explicitly operationalise the concept of SSR within a named unit. The Security Sector Support Unit (SSSU) exemplified more general issues with SSR; namely conceptual confusion, bureaucratic space and the skills set of individuals involved.
- Though often mentioned in UN documents, no comprehensive review of the security sector has taken place three years after it was mandated. The SSSU was effective in securing donor assistance for the review, but national actors seemed disinterested in conducting it.
- Bilateral programmes have been overwhelmingly technical in nature. While problems affecting security institutions are manifested in technical deficiency, political issues are rooted in regionalism, trust and history. Programmes have suffered from reluctance to acquire the knowledge, language and respect required.
- An impressive list of legislation means that, on paper, some of the deficiencies identified in 2006 are being resolved. The difficulty will come in implementation. Impunity in the security sector is a particular concern.
The example of Timor-Leste clearly demonstrates the need for open examination of how the concept of SSR can be implemented.
- The concept of SSR may be too big to be coherently implemented, especially in a fast-moving environment. A holistic approach at a strategic or policy level is hard to translate down to a tactical level. Many actors in the security sector remain confused as to what SSR is.
- A range of institutions have invested in understanding the drivers, inhibitors and definitions of SSR. But they are behind in thinking through the kind of institutions needed.
- Many people working on the security sector do not have the degree of inbuilt knowledge that faithfully implementing the concept would require. Learning languages and becoming familiar with complicated histories, personalities and processes takes time and is not easy; but it should be encouraged.
- The solution may be to trim down the concept of SSR so it is more accessible. This will require introspection on behalf of those who formulated the concept and those implementing it. The result may be a more limited, modest policy approach more in tune with the post-conflict environment.
