What are the links between politics and security sector reform (SSR) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)? This chapter argues that SSR should be understood as a political process, rather than as a purely technical issue. Obstacles to reform include the absence of effective oversight mechanisms and donor fragmentation. SSR efforts (encompassing the army, police, military, and civil and criminal justice) need to be scaled up in the DRC to foster long-term peace and security.
SSR is inextricably linked to the wider political process in the DRC. Democratisation faces a number of challenges including a lack of: transparency, oversight and accountability, and credible opposition. These challenges are also reflected in the process of reforming the security forces, especially the army. Significant advances have been made since the elections of 2006, but the army remains largely ineffective, operates without proper oversight and has failed to win the trust of the population.
Historical factors help to explain the challenges facing SSR in the DRC. The legacy of colonial rule affected the security apparatus, which was designed to meet the needs of those in power, rather than the needs of the people. Following independence, the statebuilding agenda was dominated by elites and reform of the security sector served their interests. Other challenges include:
- The necessary oversight institutions and mechanisms are currently in place. However, they lack the required funding and capacity to function effectively.
- Gender mainstreaming is often overlooked in SSR despite the prevalence of rape and the fact that the armed forces are the main perpetrators of sexual violence.
- Donor activites are not coordinated and donors are reluctant to share information on SSR. There is also a lack of common ground among European donors, China and Southern donors (e.g. Angola).
- Difficulties in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process include the mismanagement of funds and lack of political will, expertise and training.
- Despite a positive start, police reform is hampered by a lack of strategic vision and oversight.
Policymakers should note intended and unintended coping strategies in the context of SSR in the DRC. For example, mobile phones were used creatively in DDR programmes to deal with a lack of equipment, weak communications and unreliable banking systems. Political deadlock led to positive links with non-traditional actors in SSR. For example, cooperation with development agencies resulted in new programmes aimed at improving the army’s living conditions and assisting with flanking measures. It is important to:
- Recognise the interdependence between SSR and the political process: Attention to political factors is especially important during political transitions.
- Address the information deficit: In fragile situations the main challenge to SSR is lack of information and the temptation to do business as usual. Centralised information is needed on issues such as human resources, deployment, command structures, funding allocations and weaponry.
- Strengthen oversight: Rules alone do not curb abuse. Civilian oversight and enforcement mechanisms must be reinforced to rebuild trust in the security sector. Gender mainstreaming should also be prioritised in SSR.
- Manage expectations: The army faces a dual task of undertaking reform and fighting multiple armed groups, which places a heavy burden on the security system.
- Use technical advice: Donors should draw on the lessons of small, forward-looking operations such as the EU mission, which has undertaken unique information-gathering activities.
- Adopt a whole-of-government approach and prioritise donor harmonisation: A cohesive approach is urgently required among both traditional and emerging donors.
