Having initially omitted reintegration from its DDR programming, (assuming that this would happen spontaneously), Namibia spent the next fifteen years trying to address its former ex-combatants’ demands. This paper finds that Namibia’s reintegration programmes ultimately produced results, including – unusually – the creation of thousands of jobs for ex-combatants in the public sector. However, those results seem to have favoured government supporters, and were both economically and politically costly. Three key lessons for reintegration programmes emerge: 1) all procedures should be transparent, and benefits equitably distributed; 2) outside stakeholders can provide much-needed impartiality; and 3) links with genuine security sector reform can promote reconciliation and create jobs based on actual security needs instead of on political expedience.
Long-running protests by unemployed ex-combatants in Namibia led to ‘reintegration by appeasement’. The country wasted millions on failed projects that increased ex-combatant resentment and tainted the government with charges of corruption and mismanagement. Ultimately, jobs were found for nearly 12,000 ex-combatants, but at the price of bloating the public sector. In addition, DDR was not linked to security sector reform.
Namibia’s first attempt at targeted reintegration involved three (uncoordinated) programmes: severance pay; resettlement assistance; and vocational training and job placement through the ‘Development Brigades’. None had much success, and so the government established the Socio-Economic Integration Programme for the Ex- Combatants (SIPE). SIPE managed a War Orphans Fund and called on the private sector to employ ex-combatants. However, it was initially (like the Development Brigade centres) largely a forum for collective protest.
The Cabinet Committee on Ex-Combatants was therefore reconvened, and by 2001 a Peace Project had placed 12,000 ex-combatants (mostly from the armed wing of the governing party) in public sector entry-level positions. Although this programme ended ex-combatants’ protests, it inflated an already-bloated public sector and undermined the government’s goal of decreasing the public sector’s size. Other government reintegration interventions included:
- The recruitment of ex-combatants (again, mostly those politically aligned with the government) into a new Special Field Force (SFF). The SFF was created ostensibly as a border guard, but its political control and loyalty have security implications and raise questions about the government’s motivation.
- The War Veterans Fund provided monthly cash payments of N$500 (USD$175) to disabled ex-combatants from August 2000. The eligibility criteria effectively exclude ex-SWAPO dissidents (politically opposed to the government).
Reintegration was facilitated in Namibia by government incentives to gain public support, the feasibility of a large-scale job placement programme, and emerging markets suited to the skills of ex-combatants. In the environment and tourism sector, for example, ex-combatants filled needs within Anti-Poaching Units, and as part of teams locating old arms caches and minefields. However, reconciliation is incomplete, and a reintegration process that was never completely transparent created resentment. Programmes have been criticised for giving preferential treatment to ex-fighters from the armed wing of the party in government, and particularly to the ethno-linguistic kin of party leaders. Further, a dangerous sense of special entitlement among former combatants may have increased rather than decreased. The following lessons can be learned:
- Combatants must have equal access to benefits. Combatants from both sides must be targeted and given equal access to information about reintegration programmes. Accurate identification and verification of combatants should take place at the time of demobilisation.
- Independent donors and stakeholders can pressure parties to negotiate agreement over reintegration benefits and can provide political cover when choices are unpopular with ex-combatants or the general public. Outside actors are best placed to neutralise reintegration as a potential source of political conflict when they are involved in the earliest stages of negotiation.
- DDR should occur within the context of true reform of the security sector. It is important to negotiate up-front whether ex-combatant recruitment into new security forces poses a threat to peace, and how many and in what manner such individuals should be recruited.
