Somalia’s eight-year transition period officially ended on 20 August 2012, bringing to a close the TFG and its fractious parliament. Though the roadmap to transition process has been welcomed outside Somalia it was largely forced through by external actors. This carries the risk of isolating dissenting Somali voices, including those who may try to disrupt the new political order. Indeed, Somalia is still no nearer to statehood than it was in 2004 when the transition began, in part because of the TFG’s weak governance and widespread corruption. The challenge of providing security and any semblance of good governance in government-held areas therefore remains immense.
This report, which is the pilot study of a Conflict and Governance Mapping (CGM) project, focuses on Mogadishu and uses original data collected between April and July 2012 in interviews, focus group discussions and Mogadishu-wide household survey and mapping exercises.
Its key findings are as follows:
- There is a widespread perception in Mogadishu that security has improved considerably in the past year, with a decline in terrorism and insurgency-related violence in particular. This is largely due to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) consolidating power after al-Shabaab fighters largely withdrew from the city in August 2011.
- Nevertheless, security remains inadequate and uneven with significant areas of Mogadishu – particularly the city’s northern districts – almost entirely unpoliced. In the absence of state-provided security, residents and officials have formed an array of neighbourhood vigilante groups and private militias to protect themselves and their assets.
- A significant number – reportedly up to 50 percent – of police and military personnel work for private individuals, adding to the large number of freelance armed actors in the city and seriously undermining the security services’ ability to perform their duties. Criminal violence and violent deaths remain common, as do reported incidences of illegal arrests and physical torture.
- Residents are anxious that warlords and influential businessmen not included in the new political order could stage an armed revolt. Already there is evidence that some warlords and business people are arming themselves.
- Land is the most contested resource in Mogadishu and land claims by returnees from the diaspora and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are inflaming an already tense situation. Social unrest and wider instability could be the outcome of conflict over this key resource.
- President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed’s sub-clan dominates the city politically, creating grievances among rival clans which could also trigger unrest.
- External actors have given disproportionate weight to the transition roadmap and its six Somali signatories. As the roadmap has not been widely supported, this has contributed to the perception that external actors rather than Somalis have driven the recent political transition.
- Somalis have welcomed the injection of significant infrastructure funding by Turkey, but quiet criticism is growing that it has overestimated the institutional importance of the president and may have inadvertently concentrated its commercial dealings on a narrow section of his close allies and kinsmen.
