Over the past decade, development planners have become more aware of the requirement to acknowledge and incorporate peacebuilding (PB) and statebuilding (SB) into strategic planning in fragile contexts. Significant incremental progress has been made in tuning the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) model to better address PB and SB challenges. New instruments have also been developed and, in some cases, mechanisms agreed to ensure mutual accountability, such as Peacebuilding Frameworks and donor-government compacts. Although this has led to a proliferation of planning instruments, it has also produced useful experience in incorporating conflict and fragility issues and aligning donor support strategies. The time is ripe to reflect on this experience, and where possible, adapt and simplify planning processes to consolidate successes, identify redundancies and address gaps.
Analysis is based principally on the background paper on strategic planning, peacebuilding and statebuilding prepared for the International Dialogue (including case studies), a literature review, notes from meetings of the working group and consultations with donor and country members. A theme analysis was carried out on the problems identified in the source materials and three core issues were identified: 1) Lack of recognition of the importance of a national vision of peace and the state leading to unresolved tensions between statebuilding, peacebuilding and development; 2) Inconsistent donor alignment behind national planning processes; and 3) Lack of realistic risk assessment, prioritisation and sequencing. The recommendations stem from a need to address these issues.
Key Findings:
- If institutions engaged in political dialogue are not the same as institutions engaged in planning, the two processes are likely to fail to mesh properly and critical emerging risks to stability and opportunities for strengthening the state could be overlooked.
- The stronger and more legalistic the underpinnings of Peacebuilding Frameworks and Partnership Compacts, the better they can address sovereign and overtly political issues.
- The absence of diplomatic input into planning processes can promote more technocratic and theoretical models of statebuilding. If those models are allowed to take precedence over the political dialogue, planning will likely be disconnected from political realities.
- An overarching vision for peace and state is better complemented by a realistic and prioritised plan, grounded in a thorough and realistic risk assessment. Placing risk assessment up front enables the real risks of failure of chosen strategies to be evaluated against the importance of the issue for building peace and legitimacy.
- A key weakness is that centralised long-term planning processes prioritise on the basis of importance of issues for transformative development rather than the shorter-term impact on political settlement or state legitimacy. The risks of failure to deliver substantive change in realistic timescales (and especially the risks to peace and legitimacy) are poorly assessed, and opportunities for less risky, context-driven interventions in the most pressing areas are not adequately explored.
Recommendations:
- Ensure the primacy of political dialogue.
- Design a planning process that speaks to the national context.
- Reduce tensions between statebuilding, peacebuilding and development objectives.
- Ground development assistance in a partnership framework agreement or treaty.
- Create a joint management board to monitor and adjust plans.
- Carefully select and strengthen lead international organisations.
- Adjust ODA criteria.
- Consolidate the current plethora of planning instruments into two clearly defined and linked processes.
- Prioritise goals and delivery strategies.
