How have efforts towards political reform fared in Jordan in the past ten years? How can this performance be explained? Successive Jordanian governments have failed to dismantle the laws and institutions that thwart the development of an effective system of checks and balances. This paper charts efforts at reform, and finds that an entrenched elite has successfully fought off reform attempts in order to preserve a rentier system based on rewards for loyalty rather than merit.
Since acceding to the throne in 1999, King Abdullah II has entrusted successive governments with some aspect of political reform. Jordan has become a rentier state, meaning that the state relies on rents from non-productive sources such as oil. These rents have been used to provide privileges to the political elite in exchange for its loyalty.
This elite has become so entrenched that it resists reform attempts both from below, and also from ‘above’, from the king. It will only be compliant as long as the system perpetuates the policy of favours, and is therefore likely to pursue policies that are antithetical to reform.
Over the past decade, there were four main objectives of the reform process:
- ‘Apply the concept of political development in which all powers of society take part’: Political parties continue to be virtually non-existent in Jordan, and a harsh law on political parties severely restricts their freedom. Attempts to overhaul the electoral law have been opposed, and weak and unrepresentative parliaments have prevailed.
- ‘Development of a free, independent and professional media’: The government continues to strongly regulate the press, and can block the publication of material. The Cyber Crimes Law allows the government to shut down ‘questionable’ media outlets. Nevertheless, media outlets have proliferated.
- ‘Effective and real participation by Jordanian women’: Some progress has been made on gender issues and the role of women in decision-making: a six-seat quota was introduced for women in parliament. However, women still face legal barriers and gender-based violence and are prevented from fully integrating into society and the economy.
- ‘Increase productivity’: The economic inefficiency of rentierism is demonstrated by the growth of the government deficit by 440 per cent over the past ten years. A bloated public sector is the main beneficiary.
The king’s own policies on political reform, which aimed at striking a balance between the goals of traditionalists and reformers, have not worked. Reformers are required who recognise the need for an orderly process and are also committed to a serious roadmap. In addition:
- Finding a way to tackle opposition will determine whether a serious reform process will ever gain traction. This might be achieved through attempting to arrive at a consensus between different forces; changing the make-up of the governing coalition; or convincing the elite that the status quo is unsustainable.
- Attempts to put economic liberalisation ahead of political reform have not succeeded. A system of checks and balances is required that prevents the benefits of economic reform being enjoyed by an elite few. A failure to establish this means that the public now views liberalisation and globalisation negatively.
- No reform process can be effective without sustained implementation. Frequent changes of government, plans and priorities have all contributed to the failure of the reform process.
