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Home»Document Library»A Force in Fragments: Reconstituting the Afghan National Army

A Force in Fragments: Reconstituting the Afghan National Army

Library
International Crisis Group
2010

Summary

How can the fragmented Afghan National Army (ANA) attain the unified national character required? This paper finds that ethnic frictions and political factionalism at high levels in the Ministry of Defence and general staff have stunted the army’s growth, and structural flaws have undermined the military’s ability to operate independently. Military aid currently empowers patronage networks. Emphasis on rapid expansion of the army may outpace the capacity of an inherently unwieldy system. It is important to strengthen civilian input into military development, to confront corruption and factionalism, and to prioritise sustainability of the armed forces.

Failure to build a cohesive Afghan army has often led to diffusion of state force among disparate actors, hastening the collapse of governments in Kabul. The goal of a unified national military in service of a civilian government has frequently clashed with the tendency to create militias to insulate the state from internal and external threats.

Currently, there appears to be little agreement between the government of President Hamid Karzai and its international backers on what kind of army the country needs, how to build it or which elements of the insurgency the Afghan army should be fighting. Without a sustainable, comprehensive long-term defence posture, the army could disintegrate after the withdrawal of international forces.

Despite billions of dollars of international investment, army combat readiness has been undermined by weak recruitment and retention policies, inadequate logistics, insufficient training and equipment and inconsistent leadership. Further, patchwork command structures have hampered ANA development and deployment. Lack of coordination between NATO, US forces and the MOD and lack of consensus between Kabul, Washington and Brussels have further hobbled the ANA’s operational capacity. Further obstacles to ANA reconstitution include the following.

  • Neither legislature nor executive has adopted a body of law defining the ANA’s role.
  • Ethnic groups are unevenly represented in key positions in both the ANA and MOD.
  • Rapid ANA expansion has decreased operational readiness, and management failures have resulted in insufficient troops in insecure areas. There are gaps between reported and active duty ANA troop numbers.
  • Personnel issues are managed through a cumbersome, over-centralised and rigid bureaucratic system. Leadership development is difficult because of limited educational levels in the pool of eligible officer candidates. Drug addiction and poverty also impede unit capacity and cohesion.
  • Tension between the Afghan military’s historical roots in Soviet-style top-heavy command and control structures and the more fluid organisation of Western militaries has often pitted the US and NATO against the Afghan officials they seek to influence and support.
  • The debate on reconciliation with the Taliban also threatens to widen factionalism within the army. Reconciliation and reintegration, as currently conceived by Kabul and the US-led coalition, does not represent a route to a permanent peaceful settlement of the conflict.

The ANA and MOD need to be depoliticised by strengthening legal and administrative frameworks, oversight and accountability. The Afghan government must be encouraged to strengthen its Office of National Security Council (ONSC) and to forge more dynamic institutional links between its members, the defence ministry and parliament.

  • International support for the ANA must target quality as well as quantity of troops.
  • NATO and the US should increase investment in MOD reform and consider increased funding for ANA infrastructure development and pension financing.
  • The MOD should streamline administrative structures, clarify lines of authority and tighten resource allocation controls. It should also implement a military pension plan and rigorously review contracting and procurement procedures.
  • Parliament should enact pending legislation to standardise ANA personnel management and increase ANA staff involvement in appointments, promotion and disciplinary measures.

Source

International Crisis Group, 2010, 'A Force in Fragments: Reconstituting the Afghan National Army', Asia Report No. 190, International Crisis Group, Washington, D.C.

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