How can security institutions be reconstructed in a post-war context of military occupation? What can be learned from SSR attempts in Iraq between 2003 and 2005? This chapter finds that SSR in Iraq was a poorly designed and haphazardly implemented experiment in rapid institutional transformation that facilitated increasing lawlessness and insurgency. Lessons include the importance of understanding the political and cultural context, planning for holistic institution building and creating a coordinating hub for SSR from the outset.
When US and British troops arrived in Iraq in 2003, the swift collapse of Saddam Hussein’s omnipresent system of control unleashed revenge killings, looting and banditry which unprepared and understaffed US forces did little to prevent. Initial reluctance to fund security assistance programmes and the disregarding of advice from regional experts left unaddressed the post-war security vacuum, the resulting growth of militias and the immediate insurgency.
An estimated 5, 050 Iraqi security officers were killed by insurgents before January 2005, and 19,000-37,300 civilians had lost their lives by October 2004. Decommissioning programmes made little difference to the high number of weapons in circulation.
SSR progressed as follows:
- May-December 2003: The security situation was made worse by the disbanding of the Iraqi army, and reliance on contractors for SSR proved ineffective.
- December 2003-April 2004: SSR was done quickly by insufficient numbers of untrained US military officers. It was uncoordinated and unstandardised. Meanwhile, security worsened monthly.
- April-June 2004: The US increased SSR coordination. An Office of Security Transition was established and the SSR budget was increased. A National Security Council, joint control and command centres and a Directorate of Intelligence were created.
- June 2004-January 2005: The interim Iraqi government adopted an aggressive approach to security and expanded the roles of security agencies to include counter-insurgency. The Iraqi army performed relatively well (with US supervision) in securing the elections of January 2005.
A combination of misunderstandings, false assumptions and planning failures on the part of the US-led coalition facilitated postwar chaos. New security institutions were created, but they were very weak, dependent on outside help, inadequate and unaccountable. Four themes emerge:
- There was too much focus on training and recruitment before institution building: Concentration on numbers and on rushing Iraqis through (short, inappropriate) training programmes led to both ineffective training and the neglect of organisational structures, inter-institutional links, and accountability and oversight mechanisms.
- Lack of capacity meant that the accountability and oversight mechanisms in policy documents could not be implemented. For example, prosecutors had no tradition of holding state officials to account and no means of providing redress to victims.
- Meaningful Iraqi ownership was lacking. Little attempt at consultation was made, and consultation was made difficult by the pressures of insecurity, the lack of a common Iraqi voice, and the lack of a culture of individual decision-making among Iraqi officials.
- There was a gap between available funds and their disbursement. The cost of SSR between 2003-2005 was six billion dollars, but bureaucratic and accounting regulations impeded funding disbursement and programming.
Findings highlight the need to come prepared with sufficient troops or civilian experts to provide security, keep services running, vet institutions and detain security threats. Institution building and issues of civilian oversight should be prioritised early. Further:
- As military forces are ill-suited to maintain public order in post-conflict situations, a rapidly deployable international police capacity should be established.
- The vetting of security personnel must be informed by considerable knowledge of the country’s society, culture, history, people and institutions. Dissolution by decree is dangerous; nuanced vetting is required.
- A central hub should be established at the outset to manage the complex SSR process, providing coordination and standardising strategy and implementation at local, provincial and national levels. This hub should facilitate information sharing that can evaluate requirements and plan accordingly, while creating confidence in all relevant institutions. It should gradually become accessible to the evolving structures of local security governance.
