Why has intelligence service reform in Latin America been so limited? This paper examines intelligence services in Argentina, Chile and Peru. It focuses on the number of institutions involved in overseeing reform, the degree of presidential control and the extent to which military intelligence activities are overseen by the civilian government. Reform has been limited in terms of expanding civilian authority. Incentives for civilians to pursue complicated reform have been absent, given the military’s proven ability to operate its own intelligence agencies.
During the past decade, efforts to reform the military’s role in defence institutions such as intelligence services have been underway in Latin America. Given past abuses by intelligence agencies, politicians could use the reduction of military budgets and autonomy to win popular support.
However, there is a considerable lack of public interest in defence issues. Not only does the military consider intelligence to be important to its own mission, but reforming it requires considerable civilian time, effort and expertise. As long as civilian policymakers believe the military is capable of organising and carrying out intelligence activities, there is little incentive to enact fully democratising reform.
Democratising intelligence reform has been slow and uneven in Argentina, Chile and Peru. There have been few successes in enhancing accountability over military intelligence.
- In Chile the military regime created highly autonomous military intelligence agencies that continue to elude civilian oversight, despite numerous examples of spying on government officials and even on foreign consulates.
- Reform efforts after 9/11 led to the creation of an agency that allows the armed forces to conduct virtually any intelligence activities they wish. The legislature is granted little oversight capacity.
- In Peru, efforts to reform the intelligence agency met with failure for years.
- There was more public pressure for reform in Peru than in Chile since intelligence institutions had become tools of the president. However, the newly established intelligence service did not address military autonomy.
- In Argentina, popular mobilisation against the excesses of the dictatorship enabled civilians to construct a new military intelligence apparatus that limited military power. But even that reform took eighteen years.
- Gathering and analysing intelligence remain important missions for armed forces, who have been pressing for a strong military presence in intelligence. Counter views have been less prevalent.
Intelligence reform is not automatically beneficial to democratic civil-military relations. For truly democratising reform to happen, civilians need to make a better public case for reform. However, this solution would require greater civilian attention to complex defence matters.
- Outside Argentina, there has not been widespread pressure for democratic change. Even within Argentina that pressure was not strong enough to achieve rapid results.
- The reform itself must include taking absolute control out of the hands of the president, establishing legal guidelines for oversight and establishing civilian authority over the activities of military intelligence.
- If these issues are not addressed, the resulting system of control will reflect a weakened civilian leadership.
