How are local forms of policing shaped in post-conflict African states? What are the risks and the potential of state and donor support for these informal groups? This article analyses local forms of policing in Rwanda and Sierra Leone. It argues that country-specific patterns of local policing vary enormously, and depend on three factors: (1) the nature of the conflict and peace settlement; (2) regime ideology; and (3) the level of regime insecurity and fear of conflict recurring. In a context of less than fair and accountable state policing, security for the poor cannot be provided without the assistance of local forms of policing.
Civil conflict leaves state police forces disrupted and unable on their own to effectively prevent, investigate, and resolve crime, and informal groups fill the security vacuum. Informal groups are acknowledged to be flawed, but are widespread and widely popular. They are often preferred to state police for reasons of effectiveness, accessibility and adherence to local definitions of crime and disorder. Though often called ‘non-state’ policing agencies, the typical form is a hybrid model involving a formal or informal relationship with the state police.
Sierra Leone’s war saw atrocities committed by all sides, with the government defeating the rebels. The government elected to rebuild old institutions. In Rwanda there was genocide, the state apparatus was instrumental in the atrocities, and the rebels overthrew the government. The government therefore sought to work in new ways, with strong reliance on popular justice mechanisms. The following factors influenced these choices:
- The nature of the conflict and peace settlement: Sierra Leone’s police force was decimated, but not destroyed. Hence the regime had little choice but to seek to reform what remained. Rwanda was closer to a clean slate, and given the new regime’s past reliance on community support for its success in the war, took the opportunity to involve local people in policing.
- The regime ideology: The ideology of the Sierra Leonean leaders was state-centric and committed to formal solutions. President Kabbah had been an international civil servant and accepted the donor view that the state police should be the main provider of internal security. The western policing model was therefore adopted. The Rwandan regime, however, favoured popular justice, and incorporated the participation of local people.
- Regime insecurity and fear of conflict recurring: In Sierra Leone the government makes little attempt to engage with or supervise local community policing, although it expresses its insecurity by allowing only the army to bear arms. In Rwanda, the nationwide security structure of a centralised state harnesses the voluntary assistance of thousands of local leaders to provide crime protection and investigation, penetrating society and winning compliance for official policies.
In post-conflict African states, security for the poor cannot be provided without using local forms of policing as well as the police. However, supporting these informal agencies is not easy. The diversity, complexity and dynamism of local forms of policing make a common strategy problematic. Further:
- Local policing activities are not always compliant with human rights standards, especially in relation to women and the poor. The price of order in poor post-conflict states is likely to be a justice deficit.
- Building formal links between state power and local forms of policing is difficult. Governments and donors should look at strengthening existing informal links of information exchange, role sharing and delegated activities.
- War quickly decimates state structures, but informal forms of policing have a history of resilience and adaptability to local peoples’ changing needs.
- Local forms of policing do not require large capital expenditure. Services can be improved and reformed in ways that are both affordable and sustainable.
