Sacralisation of conflict is the process through which religion, or, in most cases, a militant interpretation of it, evolves from being an irrelevant or secondary factor at the onset of a conflict to shaping the views, actions, and aims of one or more of the conflict’s key actors. The article outlines how this phenomenon has taken place in Somalia over the past twenty years by looking at two related phenomena: (1) the rise to prominence of al Shabaab, a group that, unlike its predecessors, follows a global jihadist ideology, and (2) the arrival of foreign fighters, particularly from Western countries, attracted more by global jihadist ideology than ethnic ties or nationalist sentiments.
The key questions at the heart of this paper and of the debate among policymakers pertain to the implications of the growing sacralisation of the conflict in Somalia and the apparent internationalization of al Shabaab. Internally, the consequences seem to be threefold. First, it could be argued that the most immediate victims of the sacralisation of the conflict are Somali civilians. Studies have shown that a sacralised conflict is likely to be bloodier than a non-sacralised one, as combatants are likely to exercise less restraint toward enemies they believe to be opposing their religion. According to data gathered by Toft, civil wars in which religion is central are four times deadlier to non-combatants than civil wars in which religion is peripheral. Moreover, the shift of the conflict’s raison d’être toward religion makes a peaceful solution of it significantly more difficult. Sufi, secular, and tribal leaders have repeatedly pointed at both developments, indicating that al Shabaab seeks no compromise. Finally, the internationalization of the conflict and consequent influx of fighters and resources could potentially tip the balance, allowing al Shabaab to overpower its rivals.
Externally the situation is equally in flux, and it is unclear the degree to which these phenomena have metastasized into a direct security threat to other African and to Western countries. Some analysts have argued that al Shabaab’s increasingly radical agenda, centralized leadership structure, refined propaganda machinery, and foreign support network will make the group continue to evolve into a greater regional threat.
Some indications do indeed exist in that regard. The most significant and ominous took place on July 11, 2010. As revellers enjoyed the final of the football world cup on television screens in Kampala, Uganda, suicide bombers targeted a local Ethiopian restaurant and a rugby club, killing some 74 people and injuring many more. In the days that followed, Ugandan police discovered a third unexploded device. Al Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack, with spokesman Sheikh Ali Mohamud Rage declaring, “al Shabaab was behind the two bomb blasts in Uganda. We warned Uganda not to deploy troops to Somalia; they ignored us. We warned them to stop massacring our people, and they ignored that. The explosions in Kampala were only a minor message to them. We will target them everywhere if Uganda does not withdraw from our land.”
Analysts are left to wonder whether this first aggressive sally beyond Somalia’s borders will be followed by other attacks not only in other African countries—something Ugandan, Rwandan, and Kenyan authorities expect almost with certitude—but also in the West. A January 2010 U.S. Senate report quoted U.S. law enforcement officials as saying that “al-Shabaab would hit US or other Western targets outside of Somalia if it could.” Authorities in various Western countries seem to share this assessment. In August 2009 in Melbourne, Australia, police broke up a plot involving a mixture of Lebanese and Somali Australian citizens that appeared at a first glance to be the realization of these fears. While specifics around the plot remain unclear as the men face trial, there is evidence that some of the plotters had trained in Somalia alongside al Shabaab, were in contact with individuals in Somalia, and were apparently plotting to mount an attack on an Australian army base. While an al Shabaab spokesman denied any links between the group and the plotters, the case has raised concerns about the direction in which al Shabaab appears to be going.
It remains somewhat unclear exactly what strategic benefit al Shabaab would draw from launching an attack in the West. On one hand it would seem a strategic blunder for a group that has yet to consolidate its power over Somalia, as it would likely result in unwanted external attention. On the other hand, as this article has shown, over time the group’s rhetoric and actions have increasingly mirrored al Qaeda’s. The possibility has to be drawn that the trajectory that al Shabaab is following is one similar to those of other armed groups that al Qaeda has managed to attract to its vision of global jihad. If this is the path that the group is moving along, then it would make sense that at some point they would have to match up to their increasingly “global” rhetoric and launch an attack on their “far enemies” in the West.