How does a rebel movement transform itself into the leading party of democratic opposition? What are the prospects of such a party? This Conflict, Security and Development publication examines the development of the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and its emergence as the leading opposition party.
UNITA’s transformation is attributed to acute war weariness after four decades of conflict lead to solutions being sought inside the political process. The support of Non Government Organisations (NGOs) and faith groups are held as key factors in demobilisation and reintegration.
Founded in 1966 by Jonas Savimbi, UNITA exploited feelings of exclusion in the largest ethnic areas of the centre and south. Initially fighting the Portuguese colonial government, civil war was to ensue with the single party socialist government (MPLA) by the end of the 1970s. Initial attempts to resolve the conflict, and demobilise and integrate combatants commenced in the 1990s, but met with failure. This can be partly attributed to limited UN powers in monitoring mandates, funding and enforcement. Disarmament and demobilisation were unsuccessful due to ineffective arms and oil embargoes.
However, the key factor in the breakdown of peace negotiations was the attitude of Savimbi. He was unwilling to hold an opposition role in government, and this led to the resumption of fighting after the 1992 elections. The UNITA leader then refused to sign the Lusaka Protocol in 1994, or attend the inauguration of the National Unity Government in 1997. This ensured the continuation of sporadic conflict during the 1990s.
It was not until the death of Savimbi, combined with a number of other factors, that enabled UNITA to transform itself from a military into a political movement:
- Savimbi’s immediate successor, Isaias Samakuva, supported the resumption of talks with the government, and was willing to accept an opposition role, stating: ‘UNITA does not plan to, nor could it aspire to run the country alone.’
- The military defeat of UNITA and combat fatigue removed the ability to wage war. With non-political options removed, there was little choice left but to integrate.
- 105,000 ex-combatants (including 18 generals) were rapidly demobilised and integrated into the Armed Forces of Angola by October 2003. Relatively successful disarmament occurred with an estimated 90 per cent of weaponry collected.
- Improved reintegration of former rebels into society since November 2005. With the help of NGOs and faith groups, 63,000 out of 97,114 ex-combatants receive reintegration support.
- Financial disadvantage, with the MPLA directly benefiting from state funding of £23m compared to UNITA’s £14m.
- The Angolan authorities increased acceptance of opposition party activity as violence recedes. This stands as testament to the success of integration programmes.
- A broadening appeal, with prospects of traditional MPLA peri-urban supporters voting for this former guerrilla movement to air frustrations. Success is dependent on the voting patterns in the cities.
