What can be learned from the involvement of private military companies (PMCs) and private security companies (PSCs) in Iraq’s security sector? This paper finds that their impact in Iraq has been mixed, with lack of regulatory capacity and local ownership particular problems. Lessons include the need for better coordination among and with PMCs, and improved international regulation of PMCs. Transparency and oversight mechanisms are needed while a PMC operation is ongoing, not after the fact.
In Iraq, PMCs can be divided into two types: security contractors and logistics contractors. There are also domestic PSCs, some of which have reportedly used heavy-handed tactics and routinely disregarded Iraqi government forces. Initially, PMCs were involved in the retraining of Iraqi security forces, but due to poor performance and increasing challenges posed by the insurgency, this task reverted to American military forces. PMCs have since provided three main categories of services in Iraq: personal security details for senior civilian officials; non-military site security (buildings and infrastructure); and non-military convoy security.
The US grossly underestimated the number of troops that would be required for stability and security operations in Iraq. As a result, companies such as Halliburton were needed to meet the military logistics requirements. In addition, construction firms had to turn to private security contractors in order to protect their employees from insurgent attacks.
PMCs/PSCs were not very successful in training the Iraqi military, but seem to have been more effective in relation to police training. The least successful aspect of PMC/PSC operations in Iraq concerns local ownership.
- The number of police officers and soldiers trained was far below expectations. Reported reasons for this included: low pay, not enough emphasis on basic combat skills, and insecurity preventing recruits from travelling to attend training.
- In February 2004, Dyncorp won a State Department contract for civilian police services worth about $1.7 billion over five years. By most accounts Dyncorp contractors have performed competently. Problems were mainly due to the US not providing funding on time.
- Local ownership has been hindered because most accountability and transparency issues were between the companies and the US government, not the Iraqi government.
- There are anecdotal reports that many Iraqis prefer the use of foreign PMC/PSC personnel as honest brokers. However, a prerequisite for a stable security sector is public confidence in fellow citizens staffing positions in the security sector.
- Both PSCs and PMCs have been accused of corruption. For example, an auditing board sponsored by the United Nations recommended that the United States repay $208 million to the Iraqi government for 2003-2004 contracting work assigned to Halliburton subsidiary Kellogg, Brown & Root.
- While regulations for PMCs in Iraq exist, implementation capacity is weak due to insecurity and lack of resources.
Better coordination between PMCs and with regular military forces is required, and procedures for gathering and analysing intelligence and vetting personnel need to be improved and standardised. Further:
- PMCs can always relocate if they feel burdened by a state’s laws; international legal standards relevant to PMC activities must be harmonised. A common international standard for PMC registration and licensing could be created.
- It is possible that PMCs may contribute to an insecure environment in future by training Iraqis in military skills without the guarantee of sustainable employment.
- A comprehensive lessons-learned report needs to be compiled, based on access to records from all the PMCs operating in Iraq.
