What can be learned from the largely successful demobilisation and reintegration programme (DRP) that took place in Ethiopia following the war with Eritrea (1998-2000)? This article identifies lessons applicable both to programmes promoting DDR and to those promoting ‘durable solutions’ (repatriation, resettlement or return) for the displaced. Genuinely sustainable reintegration has economic, social and political dimensions, each of which is interconnected. Donors need to recognise both the limited role of targeted assistance (in relation to the absorptive capacity of the local area and returnees’ endowment sets), and the need for the assistance provided to be consistent and regular.
The challenges associated with ‘reintegrating’ soldiers and forced migrants ‘back’ into their former lives are broadly comparable, but neither DDR nor durable solutions have been as successful as expected. While launched specifically on behalf of veterans and not refugees or internally displaced people, the World Bank-supported Ethiopian DRP offers potentially important insights for work on behalf of both. Between 2000 and 2003, more than 148,000 veterans – including over 17,000 disabled soldiers – were efficiently, transparently and equitably disarmed and demobilised by Ethiopia’s Ministry of Defence and provided with cash and non-monetary reinsertion and reintegration assistance via the Ministry of Labour and Social Services.
The political, security and economic context in which demobilisation and reintegration occur invariably influences the outcomes. The Ethiopian context differed from other post-conflict situations in Africa, which tend to be marked by protracted civil wars and lingering political and criminal violence in their aftermath. In Ethiopia, for example, communities of return were not devastated by years of conflict, and because the war was comparatively short, recruits were not away from their homes or fields for long.
In the case of Ethiopia’s DRP, successful reintegration was largely due to the (relative) absorptive capacity of areas of return, the endowment sets of former soldiers and only lastly to the quality and quantity of ‘benefits’ on offer.
- The absorptive capacities of areas of return were heavily influenced by a combination of macro-economic and environmental factors. For example,national inflation rose during the period of the DRP, and there was a severe drought between 2001-2003.
- In terms of endowment sets, most veterans were recruited from and returned to rural areas, where kinship networks and respect for authority helped to facilitate reintegration. Also, because rural veterans were often away for only short periods, social capital remained largely intact. This was less the case for those originally recruited from urban areas (characterised by more ethnic heterogeneity, less visible solidarity and higher labour inflexibility and standards of living).
- With respect to DRP benefits, the predictability of assistance was almost as important as the amount received. When promised assistance failed to materialise consistently or regularly, veterans’ financial situations deteriorated. Further, when training in financial management or enterprise development was provided after they had spent their initial entitlements, they had little incentive to continue the course without the means to invest.
The DRP in Ethiopia was broadly successful when compared to that of other countries in Africa. A critical lesson learned is that, while reintegration is inevitably context-specific, it should be conceived broadly.
- Genuinely sustainable reintegration requires improvements in the economic, social and political dimensions, not exclusively in economic livelihoods.
- It is important to be aware of the relationships between elements of reintegration. For example, real and relative declines in income and asset distribution can lead to changes in social status and relative acceptance at the family and community levels.
- Interventions on behalf of veterans and displaced people should accommodate all three ‘tiers’ (absorptive capacity of areas of return, the endowment sets of former soldiers and only lastly the quality and quantity of ‘benefits’) and recognise the limited role of targeted assistance in relation to the whole.
