To what extent do civilians maintain institutional control over armed forces in Latin America? This research examines the organisation of defence institutions in sixteen Latin American countries and its implications for civil-military relations. Most countries of the region have not achieved the ideal-typical model for maximising civilian control, although some come close. Other countries have a defence structure that leaves too much military power unified. In yet others, there is a dual command structure that weakens the defence ministry and merges military power high up the ladder of influence.
In a region where the armed forces used to exert significant political influence, there has been a concerted effort in recent decades to lower the military’s political profile and redirect its attention toward security- and defence-related missions that fulfil the policy objectives of democratic governments. These governments know that if their militaries are to faithfully execute policy, they must be subject to institutionalised civilian control.
Overall, civil-military relations in countries such as Chile, Brazil and Argentina have improved in recent years. These states also have civilian staff in oversight roles and revised defence structures. Countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela and Paraguay have defence structures of dubious merit and have had problems with the military. Ecuador has been periodically plagued by military defiance of presidential will, which included a civil-military coup in January 2000. Venezuela was victim to a coup attempt in 2002, as was Paraguay in 1996. Bolivia has also experienced civil-military tensions arising out of encounters between indigenous protesters and military personnel sent to subdue them.
Throughout Latin America, few institutional designs have been left untouched since the end of military rule and the beginning of the democratic transition.
- In some countries, organisational designs such as dual command structures may be vestiges from an authoritarian past.
- Both civilians and soldiers are interacting within a legally mandated, rule-based environment, even if that environment was crafted with military supervision.
- With the passage of time and shifting balances of power, defence organisations can and have been revised again, this time in favour of civilians.
- Democratic politicians have taken resources away from defence. Meanwhile, military human rights offenders continue to be prosecuted in Argentina, Uruguay, Peru and Chile, proving that militaries will be held accountable for their behaviour.
- The democratic process itself has had a sobering effect on the military. Now the armed forces cannot afford to ignore legitimately elected politicians or the institutions they serve.
- Most militaries understand that it is in their advantage to exert influence within official channels so that they can earn some measure of respect.
In a region long plagued by corrupt armies, it is especially important that civilian control is embedded in the organisational design of defence institutions. For this to occur, it is important to:
- Enhance the civilian presence in key defence institutions
- Empower defence ministries
- Lower the military’s vertical authority along the chain of command
- Unify civilian power while dividing military power.
