What impact has dependence on international assistance had on the democratisation process in Afghanistan? This Chr. Michelson Institute (CMI) paper focuses on three areas of reform: structuring the interim administration; promulgation of a new constitution; and establishment of the legislature. It finds that the reform process has been shaped by the state’s extreme dependence on external support. Incompatible policy objectives have produced conflicting directions. The resulting process has given democratisation form rather than content and had related counterproductive consequences.
Past political reforms in Afghanistan mainly lacked a democratic framework. However, some limited experience with democracy helped validate post-Taliban democratic reforms. For Afghans, democratic reforms were a lesser priority than peace and economic security, but were widely welcomed because they suggested peace. The social infrastructure for parliamentary democracy was weak, with ethnic, tribal and rural-urban divisions having been exacerbated by years of war. The political spectrum was dominated by ideologies – Marxism, Islamism and ethno-nationalism – at odds with political liberalism.
The primary reason for the United States (US) led intervention in Afghanistan was to eliminate suspected terrorists and install a stable, cooperative regime. The requirements of this strategic imperative do not always coincide with the promotion of democracy:
- The democratisation process was situated within the prevailing UN approach to post-conflict reconstruction: the introduction or re-establishment of liberal democratic institutions.
- Democratic reform assistance was part of a broader and increasingly controversial international presence that grated on Afghan nationalist sensibilities.
- By virtue of its military intervention, the US held a pre-eminent position that set the parameters for the transition. It was instrumental in the selection of Hamid Karzai as the interim president.
- The post-Taliban constitution was shaped by intense political competition over whose interests it should serve, particularly regarding the choice between a purely presidential system and a mixed structure with a prime minister.
- A complex set of forces, including US preference for a presidential system, tipped the institutional balance in favour of the executive.
The dependence of the government on foreign funds and military forces for its survival eroded the foundation of democracy as a system of national representation accountable to its people. This reflects the contrast between the reality of extreme dependence and the theory of democracy:
- The chosen electoral system -Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) – prevented political parties from formally fielding candidates. SNTV would likely fragment the parliament and weaken opposition, thereby shielding the executive.
- The parliament has emerged as a weak body, with feeble political parties and a social context that favours clientelist politics. It has very limited powers to check the executive and influence policy.
- It was argued that wide inclusion in the democratisation process could help move social conflict from the military to the political arena. As a result a number of alleged war criminals, persons with links to armed factions and conservative Islamists were allowed into parliament.
- The limited budgetary power Afghan authorities possess is primarily vested in the executive branch that negotiates with the donors. The parliament is virtually excluded.
- With the primary lines of accountability stretching to the donors, the executive has few incentives to strengthen the legislature. Dependence on external support has deprived the legislature of its meaning.
