What progress did the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) make in building Iraqi security forces and institutions? This report from the RAND Corporation examines the CPA’s efforts to reconstruct and reform the Iraqi security sector. It finds that the CPA’s security sector capacity-building and reform programme, while behind on many of its targets, was moving in the right direction.
At the institutional level the CPA made a major effort to remove Saddam-era personnel who would have hindered reform. It also had some success in informing Iraqi leaders about principles of good security sector governance. Institutional reform was patchy, but is a long-term process that will only succeed with Iraqi leadership. Regarding integration, the CPA failed to overcome rigid ministerial compartmentalisation, but made some progress in reorienting the security sector into one that serves society.
In early 2005, the reconstruction and reform programme in Iraq was clearly in its early stages, as was evident in the following elements of the security sector:
- National security institutions – the CPA made significant progress in this area, most notably helping to establish a Ministerial Committee on National Security. There is, however, little sign of true coordination between ministries.
- The defence sector – the CPA failed to institutionalise key reform processes in the Ministry of Defence (MoD). Institutional weaknesses in the MoD pose a particular problem, due to the rapid development of the Iraqi Armed Forces.
- The interior ministry – by July 2004, programmes to improve the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) were making progress. The IPS’s inability to deal with political violence and the slow pace of institutional development in the interior ministry remain serious concerns.
- Infrastructure security – the Facilities Protection Service is, by design, minimally trained and has limited functions. Critical ministries are, however, deploying increasingly professional security forces to make infrastructure more resilient.
- The justice sector – considerable progress was made in judicial reform, despite a lack of sufficient support to this sector. A process to vet judges was completed and legislation to create an independent judiciary was passed.
- The intelligence services – the CPA failed to develop an integrated, coordinated Iraqi intelligence apparatus, instead developing Iraqi intelligence in an isolated and uncoordinated manner.
Six underlying problems of the CPA’s approach to the Iraqi security sector provide lessons for SSR programmes in Iraq and elsewhere:
- Lack of contingency planning – failure to conduct worst-case analysis meant that coalition planners were unable to prepare effectively even for expected contingencies or failures.
- Structural constraints on rational policy development – failure to view integration as a priority made it difficult to implement a unified effort toward policy on Iraqi SSR.
- Mobilisation of funding and personnel inputs from home countries – the scale of the operation and the security situation severely tested mechanisms for deployment of non-military resources.
- Balancing the long-term goals of institution-building with the short-term needs of fielding Iraqi security forces – some responses to the immediate security situation were contrary to long-term SSR goals.
- Ensuring Iraqi ownership of the reform process – by June 2004 Iraqi ownership of programmes and institutions was patchy and Iraqi security sector institutions had limited capacity.
- Clarifying long-term security relationships – if the US and its allies commit themselves to Iraq’s external security and SSR, Iraq is more likely to develop an effective, accountable security sector.
