The main factor driving both positive and negative developments in Libya has been the lack of a fully functioning state and of effective army or police. Local actors –civilian and military councils, revolutionary brigades, notables – have stepped in to provide safety, mediate disputes and impose ceasefires.
- The rebels who rose up against Qadhafi were much better armed. Suspicious of former members of the old regime and pleased with their newfound power, they were unwilling to surrender their autonomy.
- Central authorities have in effect subcontracted security to largely autonomous armed groups. The National Transitional Council encouraged the parallel military and police forces set up by revolutionary brigades, because it viewed them as necessary for the state to secure the country.
- Local notables have proven to be effective mediators adept at leading negotiations to achieve longer-lasting ceasefires. To do so, they have appealed to Libyan identity and Islam and resorted to social pressure as well as customary law.
During and after the 2011 uprisings, an ad hoc security patchwork has had significant success. During the uprisings, proliferating armed groups sought material advantage, political influence or revenge. Yet local leaders, revolutionary brigades and a variety of civilian and military councils took it upon themselves to keep the country whole. But these actors have both contained and fuelled conflicts: some armed groups still target foes and settle scores; battle for political and economic influence; evade accountability; and entrench geographic and community rivalries. Ad hoc security is also unsustainable in the absence of a strong state, and local conflicts are frozen rather than resolved.
The fall of the Qadhafi regime and the collapse of the security forces left in their wake an armed population with 42 years worth of pent-up grievances, rivalries between communities and towns, and intra-communal conflicts. Disputes are rooted in competing claims over land, property and power that pre-existed Qadhafi. They were exacerbated by the regime’s clientelism and patronage, then by communities’ varying positions during the uprisings, and by acts of revenge in its aftermath.
Recommendations to address immediate security needs:
To the Government of Libya and the General National Congress (GNC):
Set up an interim Crisis Management Unit comprising the prime minister, interior minister, defence minister, and the chief of staff of the armed forces, as well as the heads of the Libyan Shield Forces and Supreme Security Committee or their successors, charged with:
- Coordinating emergency responses to communal conflicts and other armed threats.
- Overseeing governance of areas of the country that are declared “military zones”.
- Authorising a special inter-ministerial task force answering to the prime minister to implement any decisions related to peace settlements or extraordinary governance issues arising within “military zones”.
Create a special inter-ministerial task force answering to the prime minister, with representatives from the interior and defence ministries, that would:
- Send representatives from the aforementioned ministries to councils of notables to observe peace negotiations and operate a direct line of communication to relevant ministers and GNC representatives during these.
- Ensure peace agreements are written and specific enough to be implemented.
- Monitor and oversee implementation of peace settlements through the justice system or relevant ministries and ensure local notables and affected communities are aware of what is being done.
To the Government of Libya, regional coalitions and reconciliation councils:
- Ensure effective and coordinated monitoring of conflict zones, reporting back to each other and to the inter-ministerial task force on early warning signs of possible renewed conflict.
- Consult with all relevant parties as to the feasibility of implementation when considering demands presented to reconciliation councils.
- Commit peace settlements to writing.
- Seek the support of international technical experts in conflict resolution, where appropriate.
- Appoint observers answering directly to the armed forces chief of staff to liaise with the Libyan Shield Forces, border guard units and military councils in conflict zones.
- Include, for as long as their contracts with the government are active, the Libyan Shield Forces in noncombat-related training programs provided by the international community.
- Support the work of the Crisis Management Unit and the inter-ministerial task force dedicated to implementing peace settlements in conflict zones.
To the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and the European Union:
- Carry out, with the government’s assent and cooperation, an assessment of the army, Libyan Shield Forces and border guard units in military zones, focusing on their performance; status and origins of their weapons stocks; recruitment from, as well as relations with local armed groups and
- communities; and border management activities.
- Task observation missions to monitor the progress and implementation of ceasefire agreements in communal conflict areas.