This evaluation assesses IDB’s role in contributing to the coordinated solution of transnational challenges during the period 2000-2011. The evaluation found that the relevance and effectiveness of IDB’s Technical Cooperation program has been limited – in particular the Regional Public Goods program. The efficiency of the transnational Technical Cooperation program has been reduced by specific characteristics of the RPG program, though the Regional Public Goods team has been successful in mitigating some of these challenges through strong execution. Even in technical cooperation that financed pilots, asymmetric ownership among countries has been a serious constraint to sustainability.
The objective of this evaluation is to assess the Inter-American Development Bank’s role in identifying and contributing to the coordinated solution of transnational challenges during the period 2000-2011. For the purposes of the evaluation, a project is transnational if there are additional benefits to a country from having a coordinated approach with other countries. OVE applied this definition to the “regional” portfolio of the Bank and identified 204 non-reimbursable operations and two projects (with five operations) that addressed transnational challenges in Latin America. The evaluation questions are organized around the OECD-DAC criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, plus the ad hoc criteria of incentives.
The evaluation team carried out a literature review of the transnational challenges and 264 interviews in nine countries and Headquarters. These interviews covered 71 operations (e.g. team leaders, executing agencies, national focal points). Besides the portfolio-related interviews, the team discussed the operational implications of transnational operations with country representatives, fiduciary specialists, and legal specialists in the IDB as well as key informants at the AfDB, ADB and the World Bank. The team also took advantage of a number of staff surveys as well as an earlier round of structured interviews. Finally, parts of the portfolio covered by this evaluation had already been evaluated by OVE in the past (e.g. IIRSA, PPP, TCs).
Transnational operations face a pervasive misalignment of incentives. Without concessional funds, countries have limited incentives to undertake these costly operations. The IDB should carefully consider the pros and cons of deepening its engagement in transnational projects and related technical cooperation. In the event it chooses to do so, it should take steps to identify ways to enhance concessionality, and adapt IDB processes, structures, incentives, and budget to facilitate the implementation of transnational projects. It should also enhance the effectiveness of the transnational technical cooperation program, which should continue at some level of funding.
