How far is it possible to define and measure fragile states, and to distinguish between different types and processes of state fragility? This paper forms part of a report by the Danish Institute for International Studies, and argues that the debate on fragility suffers from three interlinked, mistaken assumptions. These are that: i) different fragile situations share sufficient characteristics to allow for similar types of support; ii) social change can be engineered through careful planning; and iii) that a Weberian conceptualisation of the state is a relevant goal in all fragile situations. In order to work effectively with fragile states, however, there can be no shortcut to detailed analysis of the historical evolution and specific characteristics of individual situations.
The term ‘fragile state’ tends to refer to states that represent persistent challenges for the donor community by not living up to Weberian expectations and by foreshadowing the risk of collapse. Large variations exist in donors’ definitions of state fragility, however, and therefore in the countries included in their indexes. Definitions tend to emphasise either state functionality, the effects of state fragility, or the difficulty of achieving cooperative donor-government relations.
Various analytical frameworks, instruments and indexes claim to measure different dimensions and indicators of state fragility. A comparison between different instruments exposes a troubling lack of convergence, however. The instruments also tend to be fairly general, and do not offer precision to help decide on key intervention points.
Many attempts have been made to identify and distinguish between different fragile situations in terms of the conditions and possibilities for donor intervention. The problem with such typologies is that they seek to limit the diversity and complexity of fragile situations to a few categories. Countries placed in one category are likely to evolve differently, and interventions based on such categorisation may accordingly push some of them further into fragility. Typologies include:
- The World Bank’s ‘four main business models for engagement’: prolonged political crisis; fast turnaround; gradual improvers; deteriorating governance.
- The BMZ matrix of the level of governance and the trends in the development orientation of governments.
- A typology in the academic literature emphasising the lack of will and/or capacity of governments.
- Four poverty traps: conflict; natural resources; being landlocked with poor neighbours; and bad governance in a small country.
The fragile states agenda is permeated by Weberian ideals of what a state should look like. There is an assumption that all states will converge towards a model of Western democracy which provides the guidelines for state-building and benchmarks for existing statehood. Donors need to focus not on ideals, however, but on the analysis of ‘empirical statehood’ and the actually existing arrangements of authority and security. Further implications are that:
- Analytical tools must provide an assessment of the types of situations and processes that characterise specific state trajectories.
- To the extent that they develop series of annual observations, measurement instruments can become valuable aids in monitoring developments and providing inputs for further analysis.
- The specific purpose, the actual users and their interests must all be taken into account when deciding whether and how to use which instruments.
