The use of private security companies (PSCs) by humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) not only poses management and control issues for NGOs, but can have a serious impact upon the execution of humanitarian policy. This paper, authored by Christopher Spearin, identifies issues that affect PSC/NGO interaction and suggests policy options to clarify the NGO approach to PSCs. NGOs should consider improving their security savvy and take steps to help create a more humanitarian-centric PSC marketplace.
The end of the Cold War, subsequent increase of weak and failing states and 9/11 have contributed to a change in the dynamics surrounding humanitarian assistance. Once protected by their commitment to neutrality, humanitarian workers are no longer shielded from violence. International organisations and the humanitarian NGO community now recognise and promote the need for security for humanitarian NGOs.
NGOs now hire PSCs to conduct threat and context assessments, security training and provide security management and guards. While NGO/PSC interaction facilitates delivery of humanitarian assistance, NGOs face complex political and operational challenges vis-à-vis the culture, norms and practices of PSCs.
Some key challenges of the NGO/PSC interaction:
- Approaches to security and market ecology: NGOs and PSCs express different cultures: NGOs prefer the acceptance model; PSCs prefer protection and deterrence models. PSCs are often ignorant of humanitarian norms. Some PSCs contract with NGOs to achieve recognition and legitimacy. As the largest customers of PSCs, wealthy governments can influence the security market in ways that do not coincide with humanitarian norms. NGOs do not occupy a strong position in the market ecology of the private security industry.
- NGO linkage to other actors: PSCs often hire local personnel who have links to other armed parties, thus compromising NGO work with local populations. The reputation of other PSC customers can reflect badly on NGOs. NGOs can be linked to state activities in conflict zones due to a common PSC denominator.
- NGO organisational challenges: Given the decentralised organisational structure of NGOs, NGO headquarters generally lack the ability to apply consistent security approaches at all levels of their organisations. NGO security training is poor, with inadequate policies and uneven employee buy-in. NGOs lack security market savvy and do not have a coherent PSC market position. Competition among NGOs inhibits the creation of pan-NGO policies and standards concerning employment of PSCs.
The following are policy options NGOs could explore:
- NGO headquarters could compile information on the capabilities, past operations and client bases of PSCs for national and field distribution. NGO field personnel could share their insights on PSCs with headquarters and suggest how the NGO/PSC interaction could best be managed;
- Discussions about the NGO/PSC interaction at the field-level would promote informed security approaches without compromising traditional field-level autonomy;
- NGOs could utilise existing NGO associations to share information and participate in common security training;
- Since many NGOs receive government funding, state donors of NGOs can exert influence on NGO contracts with and use of PSCs. NGOs need to be assertive in their relations with state donors so that their security concerns are addressed; and
- Since the International Committee of the Red Cross is seen as the guardian of international humanitarian law, it could expand an appreciation of humanitarian law by addressing how PSCs should be contracted and managed in the service of humanitarian NGO activities.
