This report presents in-depth academic analysis to both top down attempts and more than 35 different local negotiations in different parts of Syria, between October 2011 and October 2014. It uses information gathered by field researchers inside Syria and from 45 interviews. It includes case studies on Homs, the Damascus countryside, Ras al-Ain and the provision of services in Dara’a and Aleppo.
Key findings:
- Behind the images of blood and war in Syria, there exists among civilians both the desire for and the undeniable potential to achieve peace. This is being expressed in a growing number of bottom-up peace-making initiatives, despite the many obstacles in the way. Peace is indeed possible in Syria if an integrated model combining bottom-up and top-down approaches to peace is adopted.
- While local agreements can prove problematic in some areas, and have been co-opted as part of surrender policy or used as a military tactic by other forces, they have delivered tangible improvements on the ground that top-level talks have singularly failed to achieve. If properly supported and observed, local deals could offer the best hope for alleviating the suffering of the Syrian people – by reducing levels of violence, providing safe havens within Syria, and offering access to humanitarian assistance.
- No top-level agreement is likely to succeed without the engagement and commitment of local actors in the process. Rather than being dismissed, local agreements must be considered an essential element of a broader, inclusive solution to the conflict.
- international mediators that can support and advise local civil mediators and help to facilitate local deals;
- international monitors in areas where violence is not intense and where local peace deals are reached, and peacekeepers in violent areas, with a Chapter VI (UN Charter) mandate;
- humanitarian and relief agencies, the presence and engagement of which has proved to be an incentive for truces;
- consideration of Syrian-composed, civil society-based mediation teams and monitoring forces;
- assistance in facilitating the demobilization of fighters, their reintegration into civilian life and protection, as part of a broader political process and the cessation of armed violence.
Recommendations
Neither the bottom-up approach to peace nor the top-down one is likely to deliver significant results on its own. A new, combined and integrated model is needed. Significant progress in reaching peace in Syria can only happen if local factors are considered in the context of the regional and international situation.
Local ceasefire agreements should be an essential part of any solution, but they need to be part of a larger, comprehensive central peace plan.
Outside Syria, there should be a greater focus on achieving agreements among the international and regional parties before attempting to foster any significant progress among Syrian parties engaged in top-level talks. There must be clear agreements and commitments among the international and regional parties to support peace and de-escalate the conflict. In particular, the flow of arms from outside states must be halted. All parties should honour agreements not to capitalize on ceasefires to rearm military units while the ceasefire holds.
Inside Syria, the international community should upscale its presence and engagement on all levels. This should include:
It is essential for sustainable peace that Syria’s war economy is undermined. By tracing the revenue sources of the various warring parties and their associated networks, it ought to be possible to identify levers to weaken the capacity, the will, and the effectiveness of violent actors. The effect of sanctions imposed on Syria in accelerating the war economy should be considered in this respect.
Priority should be given to engagement with local leaderships inside Syria, whether military, civil, or traditional, since they are far more able to mobilize their constituents and understand their needs than leadership outside the country. While communicating with one, presumably unified, exiled leadership can be more convenient, it is far less effective.
Civil society (by which we mean civil organizations, traditional leaderships, and, on occasion, local business) must be engaged and empowered. Among all the actors in Syria, it is the only one that is able to liaise with all other groups in order to reach peace. Engaging with and enabling civil society is crucial to success in reaching ceasefires, delivering humanitarian aid, and providing basic services.