At what point during an insurgency does negotiation become an option? This study by the University of Pennsylvania identifies points at which peace processes are likely to begin and explains the timing of negotiation during insurgency. It presents a game theory model and tests predictions against the State Failure Data from 1955-2001. The findings suggest that early negotiation is preferable. If the insurgency is not managed within the first ten years the likelihood of a settlement diminishes.
In the majority of insurgencies, combatants refuse to negotiate. States often denounce insurgents as criminals. Yet some conflicts do reach a point where the two sides agree to open negotiations. The literature suggests that successful negotiation can occur where: (i) Stalemate or balance or power is reached (conflict becomes ripe for resolution where the state is locked into a mutually hurting stalemate) (ii) There are escalating costs of war (democratic governments are more sensitive to war costs than authoritarian governments, and so they may be compelled to negotiate earlier).
Duration analysis suggests that negotiation is most likely to occur at about fours years into the insurgency. After four years, the likelihood decreases. Insurgencies are at their most vulnerable in the early stages, but become more resistant to collapse over time. If the insurgents can survive their initial vulnerability and adapt to government tactics then a window for negotiation is likely to emerge. Overall, if conflicts are not managed within about ten years of them beginning, the likelihood of eventual settlement diminishes.
Further findings in relation to the key variables are:
- Uncertainty: Meaning the willingness of governments to take risks and insurgents’ ability to predict whether the government will negotiate and distinguish between hardline and softline governments. If uncertainty is high, the likelihood of a peace process beginning is higher.
- Power and repressive capacity: Meaning the state’s economic and military capacity, and the effectiveness of government institutions. The ability of government to use repression will be at its highest levels in the first year, but drop substantially after that.
- Executive Constraints and War Costs. Executive leadership may constrain the use of power against the insurgents. Unconstrained executives are unlikely to initiate negotiation. Leaders with total discretion have much greater capacity to fight insurgents than heavily constrained leaders who cannot pay the costs of war.
Early negotiation is preferable. The model offers several other policy implications for states facing insurgency:
- The use of force to destroy insurgencies may often be successful but if the government holds out, the insurgents may collapse owing to their own weakness.
- Pushing the insurgencies towards collapse by adopting repressive tactics is risky because there is a possibility that repression will fail and the insurgency will grow stronger.
- If repeated attempts to repress fail, the insurgency will more than likely survive.
- Peace early is likely to be cheaper than peace after fighting.
- Since insurgents know they are weak and vulnerable early, government will be in a better position to influence the terms of the settlement at this time.
- If the fighting continues the insurgents may enhance their capabilities and bargaining position.
