How should disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) be approached in Iraq in order to address the violence perpetuated by myriad armed groups? This article identifies possible strategies for this sensitive and controversial process by identifying, through comparison with Afghanistan, how not to carry out such programmes. Appropriate preparation for such a process is essential. First, greater understanding of the various armed groups and more support for state security institutions is needed.
Iraq is a complex and challenging security environment, having many different sources of violence in ethnic, sectarian, and tribal armed non-state actors (NSAs) with large numbers of combatants. Security sector reform (SSR), which has already occurred on an ad hoc basis with the restructuring of the national army and police force, will thus play a pivotal role in shaping the future of the country. How Iraq deals with its insurgency and militia groups will be of particular significance to SSR.
Afghanistan also has a complex setting with many armed NSAs, and it was also the subject of an external military intervention launched by the US and its allies. Both countries provide examples of how not to undertake DDR.
- In Afghanistan, there was little local ownership of DDR. The United Nations Development Programme planned and implemented Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme almost exclusively. Further, the process to identify which armed NSAs to include in the Afghan DDR initiative was arbitrary.
- The weapons collected during a disarmament phase usually comprise only a very small proportion of those in circulation. The socio-economic and cultural aspects of arms in Iraq mean that, as in Afghanistan, most weapons will remain hidden until there is a real transformation towards a culture of peace. The DDR process in Iraq should not make disarmament a precondition for reintegration and political progress, as was the case in Afghanistan. Disarmament can occur at a later stage as part of a wider initiative that includes all segments of society.
- Afghanistan’s DDR process missed many opportunities to link its aims and outputs to overall post-conflict reconstruction. Reintegration packages must be linked to employment opportunities and community development.
- The experience of Afghanistan shows that preferential treatment of former combatants in isolation from their communities creates resentment among community members, as reintegration assistance is seen as a reward for war crimes. Rather than adopting a one-man/one-weapon approach, a future DDR process in Iraq should take a community-based perspective. It may even be possible to consider community-based reconstruction programmes solely as reintegration assistance.
- In terms of the appropriate sequencing of activities, political stability and security is a pre-requisite for DRR. However, from the beginning of the US-led occupation of Iraq, the strategies, institutional capacities, and resources invested in the process of reconstructing the security sector were inadequate to achieve the necessary level of security.
To undertake effective DDR in Iraq, it will first be necessary to provide security support by strengthening the capacities of the national security apparatus, particularly training and equipping the national police force.
- Second, the government, not the international community, should take the lead in planning and implementing DDR. Without the meaningful involvement of national authorities, the programme is likely to be viewed as the imposition of external interests.
- Third, in relation to reintegration benefits, the engagement of different armed NSAs in the DDR process requires careful consideration. While a tailor-made strategy for each NSA involved is inevitable and the most appropriate response, it is important to realise that this is likely to be viewed as unequal and partial. The type and scope of inducements for reintegration and their allocation to different groups will need to be based on professional competency rather than political expediency.
