What are the effects of external pressures for international prosecutions on transitional justice in post-conflict states? This article from the International Studies Review explores the impact of the internationalisation of criminal justice on domestic transitional justice efforts. Domestic political elites may find themselves sandwiched between international pressure for justice and constituent non-elite pressure against it. The experience of truth commissions in Serbia and Croatia between 2000 and 2005 illustrates the ‘compromise justice’ that may result, weakening justice mechanisms and making post-conflict reconciliation less likely.
While foreign pressure can be used to convince domestic constituents that policies privately favoured by political elites are the only viable option, apparent submission to international demands threatens political elites’ domestic credibility. To accommodate strong conflicting demands from constituents and international actors, political elites may draw on the range of transitional justice policy options available to substitute one form of justice for another.
Conceptualising such ‘compromise justice’ requires an understanding of the broad ‘transitional justice spectrum’. This organises commonly used mechanisms along a continuum from restorative (alleviating victims’ pain) to retributive (punishing perpetrators) justice: (i) cessation and codification of human rights violations; (ii) censure of the old system; (iii) rehabilitation and compensation for victims; (iv) establishment of truth commissions; (v) purging of human rights abusers from public office; (vi) criminal prosecution of ‘executors’ (those lower on the chain of command); and (vii) criminal prosecution of commanders.
- Compromise justice is some stage on the spectrum below that advocated by international elites but above that sought by domestic constituents.
- The justice mechanism chosen – it’s location on the spectrum – depends on the strength of oppostition and the bargaining power of the two pressure groups, as well as on the attitudes of the local elites themselves.
- A truth commission is the ‘‘median’’ policy of compromise justice – seen where strong international pressures for criminal justice are opposed by equally strong domestic pressures.
The experience of truth commissions in Serbia and Croatia illustrates the dilemmas of compromise justice. New elites established the truth commissions in an effort to show compliance with international demands for justice and to reduce external pressure for the (domestically unpopular) transfer of individuals to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
- Both truth commissions were rushed into existence without any substantive social or political debate.
- The truth processes were insufficient and sought to spread rather than to acknowledge guilt.
- The lack of strong political backing, adequate financial support, and investigative/legal authority hampered the functioning of the commissions.
- There is evidence to suggest that other countries facing international tribunals, such as Indonesia and Cambodia, have acted in a similar manner.
Pressure for international criminal accountability fundamentally alters the path of justice in post-conflict states. The resulting local forms of transitional justice may be insincere, incomplete and, to the local community, irrelevant. Attention therefore needs to be paid to the positive and negative effects of international pressure on domestic processes, especially on organic transitional justice efforts at the local level.
