How does aid to transitional justice work? What are the patterns, types and causes of such aid? Little is known about the dynamics of external economic assistance to national transitional justice (TJ) efforts. This paper examines the aid that was given to assist two countries that were ‘post-conflict’, in a process of transition from a past period of massive armed violence. It reveals a highly skewed distribution of this aid across mechanisms. Security sector reform dominates the field entirely.
This report examines two post-conflict cases, Rwanda and Guatemala, from 1995 to 2005, since they received considerable foreign aid. It gives an overview of which donors provided how much aid for what transitional justice mechanisms and examines how the transitional justice aid was followed up. The study defines transitional justice broadly – including not only criminal courts, truth commissions and reparations but also ‘traditional’ mechanisms as well as security sector reform.
While donor justifications for aiding transitional justice in the two countries were largely similar – drawing on principles such as the rule of law, human rights and good governance – they chose different strategies for realising these aims. The approaches seem to have had opposite effects.
- TJ assistance made up only around five percent of overall development aid in the two post-conflict cases. More than half of the TJ assistance went to reform of the security sector (inGuatemala this was almost three quarters).
- In Rwanda, where TJ assistance targeted the government, the state has been strengthened, and in Guatemala, where the aid largely evaded the government, the state remains weak.
- In Rwanda donors had a stronger incentive to coordinate since aid made up a key source of income in the country and tangible results therefore were more likely.
- The political will of the Rwandan government to engage in coordinating the TJ efforts played an important part in its effectiveness.
- In Guatemala several donors showed little commitment to ensuring complementarity – an opportunity was missed to enhance ownership by the Guatemalan authorities of the transitional justice effort.
Lessons can be drawn both on the sustainability of the transitional justice processes, and on the complementarity of funding in this field.
- Donors should promote debate in post-conflict countries on transitional justice and promote the backward-looking institutions.
- Donors should try to maintain the balance between promoting local ownership of transitional justice and promoting the overall aims of transitional justice.
- Donor policy should aim to enable space to be opened for local opinions on transitional justice.
- Key actors in the recipient countries need to feel an ownership of the aid programmes for the positive results of aid to be sustained over time.
- An aid-supported project should only be sustained as long as (a) the aims of the project are consistent with key aims of transitional justice, and (b) the aims are reached, or in the process of being reached.
- Security sector reform should not overwhelm other transitional justice mechanisms.
