GSDRC

Governance, social development, conflict and humanitarian knowledge services

  • Research
    • Governance
      • Democracy & elections
      • Public sector management
      • Security & justice
      • Service delivery
      • State-society relations
      • Supporting economic development
    • Social Development
      • Gender
      • Inequalities & exclusion
      • Poverty & wellbeing
      • Social protection
    • Conflict
      • Conflict analysis
      • Conflict prevention
      • Conflict response
      • Conflict sensitivity
      • Impacts of conflict
      • Peacebuilding
    • Multi-Hazards
    • Humanitarian Issues
      • Humanitarian financing
      • Humanitarian response
      • Recovery & reconstruction
      • Refugees/IDPs
      • Risk & resilience
    • Development Pressures
      • Climate change
      • Food security
      • Fragility
      • Migration & diaspora
      • Population growth
      • Urbanisation
    • Approaches
      • Complexity & systems thinking
      • Institutions & social norms
      • Theories of change
      • Results-based approaches
      • Rights-based approaches
      • Thinking & working politically
    • Aid Instruments
      • Budget support & SWAps
      • Capacity building
      • Civil society partnerships
      • Multilateral aid
      • Private sector partnerships
      • Technical assistance
    • Monitoring and evaluation
      • Indicators
      • Learning
      • M&E approaches
  • Services
    • Research Helpdesk
    • Professional development
  • News & commentary
  • Publication types
    • Helpdesk reports
    • Topic guides
    • Conflict analyses
    • Professional development packs
    • Reports & literature reviews
    • Working Papers
    • Webinars
    • Covid-19 evidence summaries
  • Projects
  • About us
    • Our team
    • 25 years advancing evidence
    • International partnerships
    • Privacy policy
    • Terms and conditions
    • Contact Us
Home»Document Library»Malaysia: Constitutionalism Corrupted?

Malaysia: Constitutionalism Corrupted?

Library
Mark Beeson, Alex J. Bellamy
2008

Summary

Malaysia’s low-profile military is a beacon of professionalism in Southeast Asia, but while formal civil-military relations seem to reflect Western-style ‘constitutionalist’ security governance, the reality is more complex. In addition, the influential, corrupt and politicised police force is in particular need of reform. The police and judiciary promote regime maintenance rather than the rule of law, underpinning what has at times been a highly repressive government. Although Malaysia’s security sector has engaged in ostensible reform, this has in fact taken it further away from ‘constitutionalist’ governance. Unless external pressure can encourage a comprehensive process of political, administrative and judicial reform, SSR in Malaysia is unlikely.

Historically, the police force has been Malaysia’s dominant security institution. It was formed in 1870, and the military not until 1933. To protect their power, the British sought to make the Royal Malay Regiment (RMR) subordinate to the police. Before the 1980s, the military’s main role was to assist in police counter-insurgency operations. It later began to articulate its own role, but has been preoccupied with its own affairs. The police have greater capacity for intelligence gathering and surveillance, and even have a substantial combat capability. The police were an integral part of the authoritarian regime of Mahathir in particular, and are a key determinant of security practice in Malaysia.

Despite extensive police corruption and a well-documented series of human rights abuses and partisan political interventions by the police, they have not been reformed – partly because of a lack of foreign pressure. A government-appointed commission made 125 recommendations designed to address major failings in police practices, but Prime Minister Badawi has so far failed to implement any of them.

Corruption is endemic to all levels of the police, and in the military corrupt procurement seems to have led to the purchase of an incompatible array of weapons systems. There has, however, been little effort to eradicate corruption. Further findings include the following:

  • The Internal Security Act (ISA) allows the police to arrest and detain indefinitely anyone suspected of threatening national security or even deemed likely to do so.
  • The police have close connections with the incumbent government. The director of the police Special Branch openly reports directly to the prime minister.
  • In addition, public policy aimed at increasing indigenous control of economic activity has resulted in a fusion of political and economic power, enabling political leaders to provide economic patronage. Ex-military officers have been able to obtain lucrative, loyalty-inducing business positions within the dominant elite.
  • Prime Minister Mahathir achieved a compliant judiciary by dismissing some of the country’s most experienced Supreme Court judges, amending the constitution to enable parliament to enact legislation immune from judicial review, and filling the judiciary with his supporters.
  • Despite Malaysia’s multi-ethnic population, both the police and the military are dominated by Malays. The upper echelons of the armed forces remain Malay and there has been no attempt to make the RMR more inclusive. In the police, Malay dominance is becoming even greater.

Highly institutionalised patterns of power, patronage and interest permeate Malaysia’s overlapping political, economic and security fields. This means that reform attempts confront vested interests reluctant to overturn a mutually rewarding status quo. An underlying fear of either social unrest or the Islamisation of Malaysian society helps to entrench the power of Mahathir’s party (the BN) and to block domestic or international reformist pressures. Further:

  • Ethnic tensions mean that reforms are likely to be resisted on the grounds of national stability and ethnic equality
  • In the post 9/11 security environment, external pressure for reform looks set to decrease
  • Domestic pressure fore reform is hamstrung by an ineffective, government-controlled mass media and the ISA
  • However, there are small signs of greater judicial independence.

Source

Beeson, M. and Bellamy, A. J., 2008, 'Malaysia: Constitutionalism Corrupted?' in Securing Southeast Asia: The Politics of Security Sector Reform, Routledge, Abingdon, pp. 80-96

Related Content

GESI Dimensions of Human Smuggling and Trafficking in East Africa
Helpdesk Report
2023
Varieties of state capture
Working Papers
2023
Serious and Organised Crime in Tanzania
Helpdesk Report
2023
Serious and Organised Crime in South Africa
Helpdesk Report
2023

University of Birmingham

Connect with us: Bluesky Linkedin X.com

Outputs supported by DFID are © DFID Crown Copyright 2026; outputs supported by the Australian Government are © Australian Government 2026; and outputs supported by the European Commission are © European Union 2026

We use cookies to remember settings and choices, and to count visitor numbers and usage trends. These cookies do not identify you personally. By using this site you indicate agreement with the use of cookies. For details, click "read more" and see "use of cookies".