How was Sri Lanka able to secure a military victory that is proving so elusive to the coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq? But will the recent ‘Iron-fisted’ approach of the Sri Lanka Armed Forces (SLAF) which successfully defeated the insurgencies in Sri Lanka translate to an enduring resolution? This article provides a brief discussion of the use of military action to defeat insurgencies, followed by an outline of the reasons why Sri Lanka was able to dominate the battle-space. The article concludes by raising questions as to the sustainability of the victory of the Sri Lankan government and the renouncement of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of armed struggle in favour of anti-violent activism.
In Counterinsurgency (COIN) theory, the ‘Iron-Fisted’ approach to defeating insurgencies is traditionally known to be counter-productive. Recent supportive evidence of this argument is found in the inabilities of the coalition forces in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Caucuses to conquer insurgencies present there. The aforementioned case studies suggest that military action is simply not sufficient and for success there is a need to consider the underlying political, economic and social issues which can stimulate the conflict.
Nevertheless, in the case of Sri Lanka, military action was sufficient and successful in dismantling the LTTE as an organised military force. This suggests that if the right conditions are present, a decisive military victory is achievable. The article outlines key reasons behind Sri Lanka’s success in defeating the LTTE. These were seen at three levels of the battle-space:
- The strategic: the government had a clear coherent goal which was the driving force of its coherent operation. Despite criticism from the West which resulted in withdrawal of aid on the basis of humanitarian ground, Sri Lanka found new friends – primarily China – to support its ‘Plan A’ strategy of eliminating the LTTE as a military threat.
- The operational: by attacking its eroding military leadership and taking advantage of their internal splits within the movement, the government managed to force the LTTE to fight on their terms and force them to retreat into their reducing territory.
- The information domain: due to the local feature of the LTTE’s movement, the government managed to dominate the information space. No information leaked to either the international press or the internet. This inhibited journalists who could have challenged the military approach taken by the Sri Lankan government.
In its conclusion, the article highlights the need to consider the war-torn Tamil minority in order to prevent the government victory becoming a pyrrhic victory. Military victory remains fragile and localised; therefore its fruits must be reinforced and sustained by tackling the underlying causes of the conflict. The article concludes with key actions necessary to guarantee a sustainable resolution to the armed conflict. These include:
- Sustaining meaningful contact between the government and its Tamil constituents.
- Restoration of security and civil life to all parts of society at both the physical level as well as psychological realm.
