One in three Africans is directly or indirectly affected by violent conflict. Conflict destroys lives, assets, infrastructure, social cohesion and education, posing major difficulties for poverty reduction efforts. A briefing note from the PRSP Monitoring and Synthesis Project at the Overseas Development Institute assesses the synergies and trade-offs between poverty reduction strategies and conflict prevention strategies. In particular it considers how governments and donors can best take advantage of the synergies to promote long-term development.
The study includes case studies of countries currently or recently engaged in conflict, and which are also engaged in or considering a PRSP. The PRSP approach generally assumes a state with at least a minimal functioning capacity – political authority and legitimacy, a commitment to peace and poverty reduction and the institutions and climate for civil society engagement. These factors are often largely or entirely absent in conflict-affected societies, so PRSPs must contribute to (re) building them, not just enhancing them.
- Conflict needs to be considered even after the cessation of hostilities – the subsequent few years carry a high risk of the conflict re-igniting.
- The relationship between conflict and poverty reduction can be counter-intuitive. Violence can be the necessary catalyst for social change, and peace settlements may sometimes entrench exploitative structures.
- Similarly, poverty reduction strategies themselves may be incendiary – radical changes to social structures need to be accompanied by care for people made vulnerable by them.
- There is a danger that in countries still in conflict, governments adopt the PRSP process purely as a means to access concessional funds, with no real commitment to peace or reducing poverty.
- No donor engagement can have an entirely neutral political impact; aid may be seen as reward for one or more actors, it may be diverted to fuel conflict directly, or indirectly by freeing up internal resources.
- Inclusiveness of participation is hard to gauge in societies where there may still be unresolved tensions – but all the more critical. It may also hampered by tight government control over any debate.
The existence of conflict does not necessarily rule out engagement by donors, though their priorities and the nature of their engagement vary. A proper analysis of the political economic context is essential to deciding whether and how to engage.
- The decision to engage is primarily political amongst bilateral and multilateral donors – is the government committed to pro-poor policies? Will the PRSP process be transparent and inclusive?
- International financial institutions (IFIs) are constitutionally bound to consider economic, not political issues, so until recently their strategies for conflict situations have closely resembled those for other low-income countries
- Closer coherence is urged, both between bilateral/multilateral donors and the IFIs, and within individual agencies, where policy is often the result of tough negotiations between actors with divergent interests.
- Where it is too early for a PRSP, an intermediate phase may be possible – offering diplomatic and humanitarian support, and encouraging political dialogue on poverty with government and civil society.
- In situations of localised or recently-ended conflict, state capacity may still be too weak to deliver on PRSP strategies; non-governmental actors may be considered as alternative delivery vehicles for the short term.
- A PRSP can be an entry point, aiming for short-term reconstruction first, but with a strategy for pursuing long-term goals when security is better established.
