Does Ghana’s Parliament have the necessary powers, capacity and political will to provide effective oversight of the security sector? What role can civil society organisations and regional cooperation and security architecture play in relation to parliamentary oversight of the security sector? This paper from the Centre on International Cooperation examines the functionality and effectiveness of parliamentary oversight of the security sector in Ghana. It finds that while security sector oversight has improved since the return to democratic rule in 1992, the legacy of military control still remains.
Parliamentary authority in Ghana remains weak relative to the executive. To alter this balance, Parliament needs better institutional capacity to exercise its mandated oversight functions, together with the resources to enable and sustain such changes. Furthermore, existing legislation limits effective oversight, while frequent shifts in personnel and excessive politicisation of oversight institutions undermine an already weak human resource base. Parliament’s oversight role needs to be complemented by the emergence of more security-conscious civil society actors. Finally, regional and sub-regional bodies as yet lack directly elected bodies to provide effective oversight of the security sector at regional and sub-regional levels.
Three committees have security oversight responsibilities in Ghana: the Parliamentary Select Committee on Defence and Interior and the Standing Committees on Public Accounts and Finance. Findings on the powers, capacity and political will of these committees, and the Ghanaian Parliament to carry out effective security sector oversight, include the following:
- The complex nature of the security sector presents a challenge for effective oversight. Some issues are too technical for those without experience or training in security issues. Committees lack specialised support staff to overcome this problem.
- Excessive secrecy in national security matters frustrates effective parliamentary oversight. Security agencies often invoke national security to inhibit oversight of sensitive issues. There has also been a culture of self-censorship in Parliament.
- The Security and Intelligence Agencies Act 1996, Act 526 only requires the executive to report to Parliament annually. However, it can be interpreted as providing a broader mandate for parliamentary oversight.
- Act 526 does not provide for any systems of parliamentary oversight. It provides no guidance on the composition, mode of selection, mandate or degree of access to sensitive information of oversight committees.
- In accordance with Act 526, the reporting arrangement seeks to hold the security agencies accountable and within the rule of law. However, the executive has often failed to meet its obligation to report to Parliament on security issues.
- Party loyalty and discipline limit oversight, since parliamentarians are unwilling to challenge members of government from their own party. However, some committee members are beginning to go against party positions.
In conclusion, a model for the effective and accountable functioning of Ghana’s security sector would consist of four levels:
- At the strategic level, parliament should have complete oversight over security policy and objectives;
- At the tactical level, all operational issues should be examined only with the involvement of key stakeholders and experts;
- The identity of key personnel should be kept out of the public glare; and
- Civil society organisations should be brought in as an extra-parliamentary source of oversight and in order to offset suspicion between political and security elites.
