Previous research proposes that peace is more likely to be durable if all rebel groups are included in the settlement reached. This argument implies that if actors are excluded and continue to pursue the military course, this could have a destabilizing effect on the actors that have signed an agreement.
This theoretical argument is tested using data on the conflict behaviour of the government and each of the rebel groups in internal armed conflicts during the post-Cold War period. Results show that whether an agreement leaves out some actor does not affect whether the signatories stick to peace. The results demonstrate that even when excluded rebel groups engage in conflict, this does not affect the signatories’ commitment to peace. Hence, the findings suggest that partial peace is possible.
Key findings:
- Given that parties are strategic actors who are forward-looking when making their decisions, the signatories should anticipate that the excluded parties may continue to fight. Therefore, the risk of violent challenges from outside actors is likely to already be factored into the decision-making calculus when the signatories decide to reach a deal, and so does not affect their commitment to peace. The fact that the government and the excluded parties are unable to reach a deal suggests that they do not share the same expectation concerning the likely outcome on the battlefield, and hence, will continue to pursue the military course. Some parties may have the same expectations about the outcome without necessarily signing an agreement, and it is also conceivable that an excluded group may have been marginalized due to its insignificance, or may be weakened as the government redirects its forces against parties outside of an agreement. This could make violence involving outside actors less likely. However, on average, it is more plausible to expect that excluded parties will engage in violence.
- Partial peace agreements may be one possible path to peace. If some deals never are materialized because it is too difficult to get all parties to agree, then a partial agreement could be an attractive option. After all, a deal that excludes some actor may be successful in terms of getting the signatories to stop fighting. In order to ascertain whether a partial agreement is better than no agreement at all, it would be preferable to study all conflicts and compare the conflict behaviour of the signatories to that of all non-signatories.
- The expected peace duration for a rebel group that has signed an agreement is approximately eight years, whereas the corresponding figure for a non-signatory is only about two years. This finding indicates that the signing of an agreement makes a substantial difference for peace. Findings also indicate that, if agreements include some form of power sharing, then there is an increased chance of peace prevailing. At the dyadic level it is found that the risk that a dyad will engage in conflict increases if the conflict is fought over government rather than territory. Findings at the dyadic level also indicate that non-UN peacekeeping forces are not very encouraging in terms of creating conditions for durable peace.
