What factors have undermined the implementation of security sector reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina? This article reviews the reform process, analysing the key political actors and debates. It argues that the international community’s attempt to restructure the police force failed due to its implications for the country’s ethno-political power-sharing model. Future efforts at reform will need to be based on better dialogue and debate as opposed to prescriptions from international actors.
The rule of law is essential in post-conflict situations: without establishing a coherent system, in which the different elements fit well together, a sustainable peace is put at risk. Consequently, when Lord Ashdown took office as High Representative for Bosnia in 2002, he declared the reform of the security sector as a priority for his term. The Bosnian political system, built on a complex, decentralised, multi-layer and mainly ethno-political power-sharing model, had resulted in a police sector that was fragmented, inefficient, and over-staffed. The police were also highly politicised and unable to deal effectively with the crime and corruption that were becoming endemic.
Police reform was a necessary step toward political stability and was a precondition for Bosnia’s progress toward EU integration. Nevertheless, what ensued was an 18-month uphill struggle by the international community against entrenched political resistance from local leaders determined to maintain the power-sharing model and to defend their influence over the police.
- It was an internationally-imposed discussion based on internationally-dictated timelines that had underestimated the profundity of the changes being debated
- The international community itself was divided between those who viewed the reform as a technical exercise and those who sought to use the reforms to gain leverage in political discussions
- Facing a stalemate, Ashdown tried to use European accession as a bargaining chip; a strategy which backfired, almost derailing the whole process
- Only when the international community backed away from their original requests did they manage to achieve a face-saving, but not very viable, solution.
After extremely hard debates, the country ended up agreeing a political document on the issue which was far from the original ambitions of the international community and was expected to be reshaped again when it was translated into specific legal reforms and implemented. Key lessons for the international community on security reform in Bosnia include the following:
- Neither the stick of the Bonn powers, nor the carrot of EU accession can drive top-down reforms which do not have a basis of support within Bosnian society
- A new constitution articulating a simplified political structure is needed, but domestic interests are divergent and focused on power sharing, zones of influence and security (through control over the police) and the projection of power
- If the delicate power balance between the three main groups established at Dayton is to be replaced with another, it will require a strategy of debate and public engagement rather than one of confrontation and imposition.
