Transforming the security sector in Latin America has been one of the most challenging tasks following democratisation in the region. What has impeded the progress of citizens’ rights and institutional democratic reform? This article discusses the complex and intertwined political conditions that surround military and police institutional reform, concluding that progress must be made within the broader political system, not just in the security institutions themselves. Civil society organisations and advocacy networks have a crucial role in empowering citizens to engage in reform.
After twenty years of democratic rule, the evolution of political and civil rights in Latin America does not show a linear relationship between the rule of law and protection of citizens’ rights. Whilst citizens can elect authorities fairly and freely, they still suffer mistreatment and abuse at the hands of the authorities; police violence is a daily occurrence that remains unchecked in several ‘democratic’ countries.
Some of the region’s governments have attempted to reform security institutions, establishing accountability mechanisms such as ombudsmen and citizen review boards, but these have met strong resistance from the security institutions concerned. Why have centre-leftist governments failed to advance serious reform, especially in countries which have previously experienced brutal military regimes?
Understanding security sector reform and transformation in a democratic setting requires examining not just the institutions themselves, but a broader set of incentives and constraints within the political system:
- Political context: Governments are simultaneously aiming to reduce crime, maintain country stability and protect citizen’s rights. The ‘pro-order coalition’ (police, intelligence agencies, some state officials, conservative politicians and business community members) can mobilise effectively against the looser, less co-ordinated ‘pro-rights coalition’ (lawyers, human rights organisations, liberal/leftist politicians, some state officials) to overturn, reverse or drastically reduce government reforms.
- Society: Despite perceiving security institutions as acting corruptly and abusively, public opinion places the maintenance of order above adherence to the rule of law.
- Security sector legacies and patrimonial incentives: Security forces have inherited from past regimes both institutional/legal privileges, and blurred distinctions between criminals, terrorists, political opposition and the poor. Public authorities and police officers use their positions to achieve private benefits; the lack of accountability mechanisms allows high- and low-level police corruption to continue unchallenged.
In advancing the institutional reform required to increase transparency and empower citizens’ political engagement, human rights advocacy networks have a crucial role to play. They can monitor security institutions’ practices, check legal procedure and monitor policy implementation.
- Advocacy groups are more likely to be influential when: they have a positive public reputation; they have domestic and external allies; like-minded groups co-operate together, overcoming ideological and political differences; and when they are able to mobilise public opinion.
- Advocacy groups can legitimise their challenges by adopting a case-by-case approach to allegations of violence and misconduct by security institutions. This strategy must be supported by proposals of institutional reform.
- Gathering reliable information locally and disseminating it internationally is crucial in ‘making the case’ for reform. If they become good at collecting information, advocacy networks can become a useful focal point for civil rights organisations and public officials.
- Gaining a better understanding of their political and institutional contexts may help advocacy networks to advance their agenda, allowing them to frame citizens’ rights as complementary rather than detrimental to security.
- Advocacy networks should improve their capacity to monitor legislative debates and outcomes. They should develop alliances with policymakers, the academic community and technical experts to generate a more persistent influence over policy progress. Plausible policy alternatives are crucial to countering the ‘tough on crime’ discourse that entrenches institutionalised security abuses.
