• About us
  • GSDRC Publications
  • Research Helpdesk
  • E-Learning
  • E-Bulletin

GSDRC

Governance, social development, conflict and humanitarian knowledge services

  • Governance
    • Democracy & elections
    • Public sector management
    • Security & justice
    • Service delivery
    • State-society relations
    • Supporting economic development
  • Social Development
    • Gender
    • Inequalities & exclusion
    • Poverty & wellbeing
    • Social protection
  • Humanitarian Issues
    • Humanitarian financing
    • Humanitarian response
    • Recovery & reconstruction
    • Refugees/IDPs
    • Risk & resilience
  • Conflict
    • Conflict analysis
    • Conflict prevention
    • Conflict response
    • Conflict sensitivity
    • Impacts of conflict
    • Peacebuilding
  • Development Pressures
    • Climate change
    • Food security
    • Fragility
    • Migration & diaspora
    • Population growth
    • Urbanisation
  • Approaches
    • Complexity & systems thinking
    • Institutions & social norms
    • PEA / Thinking & working politically
    • Results-based approaches
    • Rights-based approaches
    • Theories of change
  • Aid Instruments
    • Budget support & SWAps
    • Capacity building
    • Civil society partnerships
    • Multilateral aid
    • Private sector partnerships
    • Technical assistance
  • M&E
    • M&E approaches
    • Indicators
    • Learning
Home»Document Library»Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, Liberal Irrelevance and the Locus of Legitimacy

Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, Liberal Irrelevance and the Locus of Legitimacy

Library
David Roberts
2011

Summary

This article advances the idea of a ‘popular peace’ to address the lack of legitimacy that undermines orthodox peacebuilding projects. This concept would refocus liberal institution-building on local, democratically determined priorities, in addition to internationally favoured preferences (such as metropolitan courts and bureaucratic government). A popular peace approach could help to create social institutions around which a contract could evolve as a foundation for durable peacebuilding.

Advocates of liberal peacebuilding insist that through elite institutionalisation, peacebuilding implants particular liberal values from the top down. Critics reject this idea, maintaining that the approach fails to engage with popular needs, undermining the sources of political legitimacy that lie at the heart of stability and durability. Elite institutionalisation could be said to compromise the extent to which liberal peacebuilding is meaningfully liberal, participatory or democratic.

Even advocates of the liberal peacebuilding orthodoxy concede that the Liberal Project is not achieving local or international security. The lack of local legitimacy is the key to understanding why peace does not prevail as intended:

  • Priorities are not designed domestically and do not privilege the institutions locals would favour to deliver their needs.
  • Whilst the process claims to be democratic and inclusive, local people are included primarily in the technical moment of elections.
  • The process lacks any means of deliberation and dialogue to render inclusion and participation sufficiently meaningful to generate local legitimacy.

The study suggests that the provision of local needs is central to generating local legitimacy, and thus in turn stability and peace. A concept of ‘popular peace’ could bring together considerations of the global and the local. This form of peacebuilding would be more genuinely representative, participatory and democratic than the prevailing model. It would emphasise institutional growth that serves the popular will and engenders a greater likelihood of loyalty than one in which institutions relegate or ignore public voices. It is important to note that:

  • There is no standardised blueprint for such a popular peace, since everyday lived realities are influenced by an enormous range of social factors.
  • Peace is particular to context and messy rather than formulaic, reactive rather than rigid. It is better suited to spontaneous contingency and complexity than the ready rubric of orthodox peacebuilding.
  • Liberal institutions can still lead the way, but they could serve the popular will before that of elite actors in the North and South. Critical research could develop methods for identifying local priorities to which global governance could respond.
  • The degree to which priorities and institutions are relevant to local people’s everyday lives will determine the extent to which a population views them as legitimate and accepts the state.
  • Popular peace cannot be defined or determined by outsiders, but outsiders can at least act to remove some of the impediments to its realisation.

Source

Roberts, D., 2011, 'Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, Liberal Irrelevance and the Locus of Legitimacy', International Peacekeeping, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 410-424

Related Content

Rebuilding Pastoralist Livelihoods During and After Conflict
Helpdesk Report
2019
Linkages between private sector development, conflict and peace
Helpdesk Report
2017
Libyan political economy
Helpdesk Report
2016
Stabilisation
E-Learning
2016
birminghamids hcri

gro.crdsg@seiriuqne Feedback Disclaimer

Outputs supported by FCDO are © Crown Copyright 2021; outputs supported by the Australian Government are © Australian Government 2021; and outputs supported by the European Commission are © European Union 2021
Connect with us: facebooktwitter

Outputs supported by DFID are © DFID Crown Copyright 2021; outputs supported by the Australian Government are © Australian Government 2021; and outputs supported by the European Commission are © European Union 2021

We use cookies to remember settings and choices, and to count visitor numbers and usage trends. These cookies do not identify you personally. By using this site you indicate agreement with the use of cookies. For details, click "read more" and see "use of cookies".OkRead more