This chapter analyses Sri Lanka’s security sector and the conflict’s consequences for the security apparatus. It discusses security sector governance and highlights challenges and entry points for SSR. An attempt at holistic SSR in Sri Lanka in 2003 failed as a result of internal political rivalries and the politicisation of certain elements within the media. Operational reforms have since been undertaken, but have masked a crisis of accountability and left security sector governance problems unaddressed. These must be tackled if there is to be any realistic chance of an SSR-directed national security debate in a political environment where foreign views and interventions are unwelcome.
The Sri Lanka armed forces have a high profile and significant resources. Numbers stand at over 200,000 military personnel, with a defence budget of an estimated US$1.8 billion for 2008. The country’s statutory armed forces have played a vital role in ending the civil conflict, but they have also been the subject of much controversy, especially on human rights grounds. Throughout the conflict years, rapid and unstructured security sector responses to conflict dynamics led to a consistently bloated defence budget, poorly structured procurement and lack of management foresight. Unfortunately the GoSL failed to appreciate that making the security sector more representative, efficient and accountable can be important preventive steps in addressing the root causes of conflict.
Following the 2002 cease-fire agreement the prime minister initiated a Defence Review Committee to undertake a root-and-branch review of the armed forces, but the initiative did not last. It was not guided by a national security policy and excluded the president and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The armed forces were later given a primarily operational overhaul, which was probably the key to victory on the battlefield in 2009.
A gradual restructuring and strengthening of the security and judicial systems should build on existing structures and take account of the following points:
- Problems in the judiciary of inadequate resources, corruption and politicisation must be addressed.
- The executive has proved capable of undermining the legislature, and the legislature does little to assert itself in the framing of defence and security policy.
- The large number of female security and judicial personnel in Sri Lanka could make these institutions more accessible to female and child victims and enhance public confidence in them.
- In spite of curbed freedom of expression in Sri Lanka, the country’s civil society has been – and continues to be – very active. However, pressure from local and international NGOs has been considerably muted by the government.
- Sri Lanka has on many occasions successfully integrated radical parties into mainstream politics.
- Civil-military relations in Sri Lanka have generally been robust, although the vast majority of the Sri Lankan security forces do not speak Tamil, which has hindered relations with local people.
- Winning the hearts and minds of the Tamil population, both within and outside the country, is crucial.
- A national security policy (NSP) is needed to provide a framework for a diverse array of security concerns. To implement it, the government would have to address the root causes of insurgency, such as minority discrimination and human rights violations.
The health of civil-military relations indicates that the military leadership should accept the need for a root-and-branch defence review. However, the popularity enjoyed by the security forces, with the exception of the police, and widespread lack of acumen on security and defence issues, suggest that this is unlikely. Neither the legislature nor the executive is willing to champion the governance change that is required.
- Civil society and international actors will not have the access, space or opportunity to initiate and/or engage in discussions on SSR.
- The decision to engage in SSR can come only from the government of Sri Lanka, and external pressure will be of little use. If the government concedes to minimal, albeit symbolic, reforms of the security sector, local and international actors might encourage more substantive reforms.
- In that case, lessons learned from the past should be borne in mind, local ownership given precedence and patience should govern all interactions with the government and its security institutions.
