This paper examines the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. It finds that in all cases, DDR was unsuccessful, partly because programming neglected reintegration. Further, the unsuccessful programmes actually created security threats within about a decade of implementation. For example, disenchanted ex-combatants’ protests demanding cash, employment, and recognition from governments have threatened national stability, and in Angola, failed DDR twice led to renewed armed conflict. DDR initiatives should be informed by principles of interconnectedness, long-term sustainability and social cohesion.
In most of the countries studied, reintegration needs in particular were not adequately met. Short-term crisis management prevailed over long-term initiatives, and both institutional and contextual factors hindered effective reintegration. Former combatants with particular needs (such as women and the disabled), were not adequately provided for, especially in Namibia.
Other factors undermining DDR initiatives included the following:
- In Namibia, the UN provided only demobilisation and disarmament assistance, and the government initially failed to address long-term reintegration needs
- In Angola, inadequate mandates and implementing frameworks, and lack of political commitment combined to unhinge DDR efforts
- In Mozambique, political and other pressures derailed DDR implementation
- In South Africa, volatile political and security contexts hindered disarmament initiatives, contributing to the proliferation of illicit small arms
- In Zimbabwe, the small Commonwealth Monitoring Force presence was relied on to keep the peace. The antagonists retained their military capability, and military clashes followed independence.
Following protests, and differentially influenced by security imperatives, ethical, and humanitarian considerations, the governments of Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe embarked on further reintegration initiatives. While the provision of public service employment alleviated Namibian ex-fighters’ poverty in the long term, the new reintegration initiatives in both South Africa and Zimbabwe were not sufficiently comprehensive. Zimbabwe’s government, for example, focused on state-sponsored pensions, but these were not adequate to ensure self-sufficiency as issues of housing and employment were overlooked. There is no record of how many previously landless ex-combatants benefited from the government’s land resettlement program since 2000.
DDR processes need to be comprehensive, coordinated, and sustainable. They need to be clearly outlined in peace agreements. The relative centrality and clarity of an agreed DDR process in the peace negotiations will affect the likelihood of successful implementation. Further:
- The design and implementation of DDR programmes should be informed by context-specific strategic evaluation of feasibility, and by input from ex-combatants and war veterans’ associations
- DDR programmes need to take account of the target recipients’ diverse needs (according to age, gender, physical condition, length of service/displacement, geographic location, education levels, and skills)
- Interdisciplinary and inter-departmental national coordinating committees could be set up to plan and implement DDR.
- Reintegration measures should be careful to avoid disrupting sustainable development and national cohesion.
