Accountability and oversight are issues that are key to effective and efficient political administration. Accountability means being accountable for actions or policies, whilst oversight refers to the role of legislatures in monitoring and reviewing actions of organs of government. However, the quality of oversight and accountability is only as good as the mechanisms and procedures that exist to guide them. With this in mind, how can these concepts be assessed in a democratic parliamentary set-up? What can be done to strengthen them to ensure a better system of governance? What is their role with respect to other organs of state?
This report by the University of Cape Town explores these issues in terms of the constitutional framework within which oversight activity takes place in the South African Parliament. This is done with respect to the roles of the two Houses of Parliament (the National Assembly (NA) and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP)). The report is based on an analysis of the country’s Constitution and the nature of the parliamentary reporting system.
There are many components to oversight and accountability. The report found that whilst the accountability and oversight role of the South African Parliament is guaranteed by the Constitution, the role of the parliamentary houses (the NA and NCOP) requires clarification with respect to their oversight functions. This also applies to Parliament’s role in ensuring accountability for other organs of state. To this end, it concludes that:
- Whilst the Constitution does not explicitly require the NCOP to perform an oversight function, various provisions do indeed give it an oversight role, albeit limiting it to matters that concern local and provincial government and to inter-government relations.
- Parliament oversees a wide range of organs of state and it may not always be feasible and desirable for it to hold all these bodies to account.
- State institutions actually support Parliament in its oversight function by performing a key watchdog role, and their independence should also be protected.
- The study also shows that the enabling mechanisms and procedures to guide accountability and oversight are inadequate. It found that joint parliamentary committees are not ordinarily desirable as their oversight functions differ and may thus lead to duplication. Also, the present parliamentary system and procedure for reporting is awkward, effectively compromising efficiency and effectiveness.
The role of accountability and oversight is crucial to good governance and has to be reinforced by suitable parliamentary systems and procedures. The study shows that a thorough constitutional and legal understanding of the accountability and oversight role of parliamentary entities is a necessity. This also extends to the systems and procedures that exist in parliamentary processes. Based on these assessments, appropriate corrective policy actions can be taken. These can include:
- Passing of legislation to guarantee the independence and accountability of constitutional institutions.
- A feasibility and desirability audit on the types and nature of constitutional institutions that Parliament holds to account.
- An incremental extension (especially useful in resource-constrained parliaments) of the list of consitutionally-recognised bodies overseen and accounted for.
- An amendment of existing rules for the regulation of reporting to parliamentary committees.
- Establishing new structures (for example, a Standing Committee) to analyse the reports of the organs of state and to make recommendations to Parliament.
- Extending the financial accountability of parliamentary bodies to other areas such as the implementation of policy.
