No issue is more important than security sector reform (SSR) in determining the prospects for peace and development in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This paper, published by the International Crisis Group, examines the status of SSR in the DRC at time of publication and pays particular attention to the role of the international community. Achieving SSR will require commitment by both the DRC and donors to create solid strategic planning to address fragmentation, corruption, political obstructionism and the dilapidated state of the armed services.
Today’s Congolese security system is the result of structures established under colonial rule and subsequent dictatorship: an omnipresent, over-stretched army with weak law enforcement. Despite the presence of the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission, fighting and atrocities against civilians continue. Most armed groups act as criminal gangs motivated by self-interest and survival. The police and military have been used historically as predatory organs to pursue political and economic goals, rather than for the provision of territorial security and protection of citizens.
The status of the Congolese police is marked by:
- the inability to provide basic law and order and a reputation as abusers of citizens’ human rights;
- fragmented, poorly trained and ill-equipped police forces; and
- a lack of coordination among donors. Police reform is ad hoc and there is virtually no long-term reform plan.
The status of the Congolese military is marked by:
- the inability to repel invaders without external support;
- deployment primarily used to quell public dissent – a fundamental perversion of its mandate; and
- highly fragmented units reflecting old war patterns and exaggeration of the number of combatants on military payroll.
An initial lack of donor coordination was replaced by an integrated assistance plan, working with the Congolese to resolve payroll issues, integrate military forces, reduce armed individuals outside army control and establish a voluntary military and manageable military cost levels. However, while donors have been willing to support demobilisation, they are reluctant to assist in the construction of a new national army. Army integration has been slow, confused and ineffective.
The general SSR decision making process is remarkably fragmented, time consuming and ineffective on the part of both the government and donors. The following are recommendations for strengthening government and donor approaches to SSR:
Police Reform:
- donors and the UN should agree on a long-term training programme, including training on human rights codes and emphasis on practical, operational details of policing;
- a formal accounting of available police manpower should occur; and
- the government should create specially trained police squads to combat sex crimes and protect victims of sexual violence in police stations.
Military Reform:
- the government should integrate command and decision making structures, develop a long-term strategy to address security threats, reduce the army’s target size from 125,000 down to 60-70,000 and establish a defence oversight committee;
- donors and the UN should separate salary payment from the chain of command, provide salary increases and better living conditions for rank-and-file soldiers, and establish an international military assistance and training team. They should also increase donor investment in army integration to match support for demobilisation; and
- the European Union should consult with the government to deploy more forces to troubled regions and continue to adopt a flexible approach to increased investment in military reform.
