Why is Security Sector Reform (SSR) so urgent for Nepal? What issues need particular attention in the proposed SSR? This paper examines the history, need for, and challenges facing SSR in Nepal following the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Ten years of civil war revealed serious shortcomings in Nepal’s security apparatus. The CPA ended the Maoist insurgency, but other insurgencies and criminal violence have mushroomed. SSR is crucial for Nepal’s stability and that of the wider South Asian region. A national security policy and a holistic approach to safeguarding the country’s interests are essential.
Security sector reform (SSR) is a new concept in Nepali security discourse. Historically, the Nepal Army (NA) was confident in its tradition of safeguarding national sovereignty and integrity. Successive governments never saw the need to revitalise civilian oversight of the NA or other forces.
The People’s War from 1996 revealed serious shortcomings in Nepal’s security apparatus. The police fuelled the Maoist insurgency through human rights abuses in rural areas. The army was poorly prepared, and had logistical, training and technical weaknesses. Politicisation rendered Nepal’s intelligence service, the National Investigation Department (NID), useless. Since the CPA ended the civil war, instability, political squabbling, and law and order problems have dogged Nepal.
- Although the Maoist insurgency has been resolved, other insurgency and violence related to organised crime have mushroomed.
- Nepal’s Ministry of Defence has not been able to assert its authority over the army. It is poorly resourced, and bureaucrats are haphazardly and frequently transferred.
- The National Human Rights Council has been criticised for taking sides and not objecting strongly enough to abuses.
- Village Defence Forces (VDF) established to thwart Maoist campaigns have increased instability. Most people trained for VDFs are now part of armed political groups in the central Terai areas and are contributing to insurrection and criminal violence.
- There have been achievements, too: The NA leadership has demonstrated its commitment to remaining apolitical, and the Armed Police Force (APF) that was established in 2001 successfully ensured peaceful 2008 Constituent Assembly elections in the Terai.
The SSR model to be adopted needs to be discussed and agreed by both government and other stakeholders. SSR can only be implemented if integrated into wider government planning. Successful SSR implementation will require establishing a national security policy and a holistic approach to safeguarding the country’s interests. SSR needs to address reform of the army, the integration of former Maoist rebels into the NA, and the strengthening of Nepal’s police and the APF. Specific policy recommendations include the following:
- The creation of an able, effective, and robust intelligence department with special proficiency in collecting information on underground groups is vital and urgent.
- The downsizing of the 90 000 strong army must be very carefully analysed and implemented in the context of the country’s current political fragility.
- A new border security force is needed to keep vigil over the open Indo-Nepali border and porous Sino-Nepali border.
- Reintegration of former Maoist rebels into the army is contentious. However, former insurgents should be reintegrated into the NA, APF, and NDI and proposed border force.
- The existing situation in which budget for security must be sanctioned by cuts in the development budget should be changed.
- Establishing an autonomous Institute of Defence Studies will help to develop understanding of national security affairs and better management of the military-civilian relationship among Nepalese officials.
