What led to the failure of Serbia’s attempt at security reform, begun in 2007? How can the Euro-Atlantic security community help Serbia to overcome its now incoherent and isolationist security stance? This article examines the political and policy-making processes that led to the adoption of the Serbian National Security and Defence strategies in 2009. It finds that attempted reform was hijacked by domestic ethno-nationalist forces; Serbia’s civil society and security institutions had not learned how to work together to achieve reform, and did not fight hard enough for it. A balanced, coordinated set of actions by the EU, NATO, the United States and Russia could help to reset Serbia’s relationship with Europe and increase regional stability.
The single exception to the Europe-wide shift towards collective security and cooperation today is the Republic of Serbia. Serbia has not articulated a realistic vision for itself within Europe, and cannot therefore create a logical and consistent foreign and security policy framework. Serbian society and political elites are divided on how to build a better future for the nation, some being pro-Europe and some having revisionist views of recent history and a revanchist security stance. While the Serbian defence community accepts that security reform and cooperation with NATO and the Euro-Atlantic community are needed, some among the political elite do not. They fear that reform would compromise the central role of Serbia’s armed service as the defender of the state’s territorial integrity. The political volatility of these security and defence issues is so acute that they have never been openly debated. Meanwhile, the exclusion of Serbia from defence reform and European collective security has meant that its armed services have atrophied from lack of resources.
In mid-2007, with the encouragement of the EU Commission, NATO, and the Serbian Army General Staff, a comprehensive assessment of Serbia’s national security and defence strategies began. General Ponos headed the initiative, and planned a smaller, professional force. However, he met with fierce opposition from vested interests. When European support for Kosovo’s declaration of independence (2008) strengthened anti-EU sentiment in Serbia, Ponos’s close identification with Euro-Atlantic integration halted the strategic planning process. The 2009 National Security and Defence strategies identified the Kosovan declaration of independence as the most significant threat to the nation and underscored the sharp turn away from support for NATO and Euro-Atlantic integration and cooperation. The strategies are also confusing and inconsistent:
- Serbia’s security policy is pledged to support Euro-Atlantic integration through the Partnership for Peace and close bilateral integration with NATO members, but remains officially wedded to territorial defence outside a collective security framework.
- There is a mismatch between security threat assessment and resource allocation; Serbia’s force structure is still organised to resist attack from a neighbouring state.
- There is wide recognition that Serbia’s armed forces need modernisation and professionalism, but the state is committed to maintaining its underused, obsolete and far too expensive armaments infrastructure.
How can the Euro-Atlantic security community modify the situation and reduce tensions? Perceived hostility by the West could embolden extremist groups and induce the coalition government to re-emphasise its nationalist credentials. However, failure to react or to ask for clarification and reassurances from Serbia would undercut reform efforts and reinforce Serbian isolationism. Thus, a balanced and coordinated set of actions by the EU, NATO, United States, and Russia is needed.
- The EU has the most significant potential influence and capacity to reorient Serbia’s security policy back towards European integration. The most critical strategic priority for the Serbian government is accession to the EU, as highlighted by the governing coalition’s electoral slogan, Together towards Europe.
- NATO needs to develop tools that can help Serbia to facilitate democratisation of the defence sector and the civilian institutions involved with security and defence policy-making. This requires close coordination and involvement with the EU’s democratisation programmes.
- NATO and the EU need to engage in a new relationship with each other that would enhance cooperation and the integration of activities facilitating democratic reforms in Serbia. In 2009, Serbia’s pro-European political leaders overestimated the strength of the ethno-nationalist opposition and capitulated without a fight. However, next time the policy results may be very different.
