Since the beginning of the Transition Period in 2003, international partners have invested considerable resources in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)’s justice, police and defence sectors under the banner of Security Sector Reform (SSR). Nonetheless the consensus is that progress in SSR has been limited.
The formidable challenges in this area do not seem to have been adequately taken into account by partners. The first challenge is the absence of a robust institutional framework in which to anchor the SSR process. Secondly, the DRC’s security and justice apparatus has always been, and remains, highly dysfunctional – structured, managed and financed to protect the elite rather than to serve public interests.
There are also competing domestic and external views of the sector. While many donors are pursuing the creation of an accountable, rights-respecting security sector, the Government of the DRC is most concerned with creating effective fighting forces. The national authorities have resisted attempts to define an SSR agenda which they feel is being imposed in a sector which is the cornerstone of state sovereignty. This situation, combined with the limited financial investment provided by the national authorities, casts serious doubts on the sustainability of reform efforts.
There are also differing views among donors of what SSR support involves and considerable competition between them. Donor assistance is thus fragmented, and the tendency to work separately favours a training and infrastructure approach. International partners currently place greater emphasis on short-term operational requirements to the detriment of longer-term structural reform.
Although most donors have endorsed a holistic conception of SSR, their support has been largely limited to justice, police and defence.
- Justice sector: A key challenge is that Congolese interest in reform appears largely rhetorical and opportunistic. Combating corruption and reforming the military justice system have been neglected. Donor programmes are focused on constructing and equipping – in a sector without an operational budget – but have not managed to change judicial practices and mentalities.
- Police sector: Foreign domination of international-Congolese planning bodies has led to slow uptake of the reform process by the national authorities. A disconnect has been evident between donor-dominated Kinshasa-based discussions on institutional and technical reform and Congolese security chiefs’ focus on operations in the East. Crime and citizen safety, the role of Parliament and connections with justice and penal reform have been neglected.
- Defence sector: Donors have mostly intervened through bilateral military cooperation, focusing on the tactical capabilities of the army through training and equipping, but without harmonising assistance. The donor approach can be criticised for shying away from the topic of the overall cost of defence reform and for failing to adequately link support to the DDR and SSR processes.
SSR support in the DRC is a collection of loosely-connected, largely donor-driven activities, implemented in isolation from essential political reforms. It is not resulting in the capacity and behavioural changes that could lead to significantly improved public security provision.
- It is important to complement training and other assistance with support that will tackle the culture of impunity.
- Moving beyond the predominantly bilateral approach, donor activities need to be more systematically informed by accountability, coherence, justice and national ownership within a framework of common action.
- International partners need to find ways of making SSR in the DRC a more nationally-led process. They should start by taking seriously the justice, police and defence reform plans tabled by the Congolese, working to bridge differences in views and approach rather than simply selecting those elements which fit with their priorities.
- Donors should avoid overloading the government reform agenda and should stick to strategic SSR priorities.
