This paper examines the normative ideals of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the realities of implementing the CPA at both the macro and micro levels of political engagement and administration.
The research is based on three main questions, namely: what are the political institutions related to the implementation of the CPA, and to what extent are they functional; what are the other factors that affect the performances of the CPA’s political institutions; and what other events or situations can disrupt the politics of partnership.
Key findings:
- The CPA has provided the basis for the creation of the Interim National Constitution, the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan and various state constitutions. These organic documents provide for the establishment of institutions to represent all branches of government and empower the government to build mechanisms of administration to assist in the management of the state apparatus. Both the CPA and the federal system of government complement each other in the business of conflict resolution and peace building. The function of a federation is to decentralize power as a means of defusing conflicts in societies that are diverse in their compositions, and to enhance social and political development within this diversity. This is particularly relevant to conditions in the Sudan, a nation that experienced protracted conflict and violence before achieving independence in 1956.
- The CPA provides for the institutions which are crucial in creating a new political environment after a prolonged period of social disharmony in the Sudan. This study has shown there is no shortage of institutions to make the political system work. However, it is the problem of attitudes that has hindered progress in establishing the necessary political institutions. The main challenges are to banish distrust and fear among the custodians of the CPA in the competition for the influence and control of territories where they prevail. These are all psychological barriers in the implementation of the agreement, which contribute to the underdevelopment of functional institutions.
- The political will needed to implement the CPA is lacking in the behaviour of the partners in the agreement. This fact is demonstrated by the deadlocks in the governance of the Three Areas, and in the recurring spiral of violence in the border areas between Northern and Southern Sudan, particularly in South Kordofan, Abyei, Unity State and Northern Bahr el Ghazal State. The parties to the CPA pay scant attention to the empowerment of institutions that could settle these disputes as can be substantiated by the cases of the Abyei Boundary Commission and the North-South Boundary Commission.
- Government of South Sudan (GOSS) is suffering from a lack of experience in the business of government, which is reflected by the fact that institutions were created without the laws necessary to govern their operations. Progress in enacting relevant legislation and regulatory mechanisms has lagged behind. It is this issue that allows people to think that corruption is rampant in GOSS and the lower levels of government.
- The overall problems of institutional development in the context of the CPA are closely linked with the political attitude and behaviour of the National Congress Party (NCP), Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the other political parties that are spectators of the political machinations taking place between the signatories of the agreement. The lack of progress in the development of political institutions is therefore attributable to the unpredictable relationships between these partners, who are the custodians of the peace agreement.
