This study examines the economy of conflict in the resource conflicts in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The paper examines the interfaces between the Nigerian state, multi-national oil companies, the international community and youth militias with the economy.
It was found that though the economy did not cause the conflict, it has become a part of the resistance and a resource for sustaining it. The economy underpins an extensive proliferation of arms and the institutions of violence and the pervasiveness of crime, violence and communal/ethnic conflicts.
Key findings:
- An illegal, criminal, informal and underground economy exists in the Niger Delta, which has been engaged in resistance against the political economy of oil in Nigeria since the early 1960s. Resistance has intensified since 1997 and there is slowly emerging pockets of armed rebellion. But this economy has emerged only since the late 1990s and has intensified since 2000. This has been coincident with the intensification of armed resistance and the extensive proliferation of non-state institutions of violence and arms. Greed or opportunities did not cause the resistance. It came almost two decades into it.
- The economy has emerged first from the exploitation of resource opportunities by retired and serving public officials and top political and business elites within and outside the region. In this dimension, the regions indigenes have merely been couriers, agents, escorts and guards. But some agents have been able to carve a niche as sub bunkerers. There has also emerged an active participation by youth activists and militias. At a certain level, youth involvement in the illegal oil economy and the pillaging of oil wealth is seen as part of the resistance. The struggles for control of territory and favoured distribution of appropriated benefits by youth groups, communal and ethnic groupings as well as the struggle for control of the social institutions of resistance and violence have characterized the economy of conflict.
- The economy of conflict actually underpins the communal and ethnic conflicts, the gangsterism and cultism, criminal violence and the proliferation of the institutions and instruments of violence. Militia, gang and cult leaders have emerged as bunkerers and illegal oil refiners. Apart from the greed and opportunism involved here, the involvement is to provide funds for arms and ammunitions, boats and equipment as well as remuneration or hand-outs to militants. This is critical to the struggle in terms of sustenance and may prolong or provide motivation for sustained resistance.
- The state management of the economy of conflict has been weak, sluggish, compromised and ineffective. The massive force and repression associated therewith is further generating more violence. The level of discontent with the nature of distribution of resources and benefits of the oil economy have disengaged the regions citizenry in terms of compact and identity with the Nigerian state. There is at best indifference to the economy of conflict. The illegal oil economy in such a circumstance may continue to exist for a long time, albeit in curtailed and small scales.
- Multinational Corporations (MNCs) have contributed to the economy of conflict by creating a condition where violently compelled benefits became the only means of obtaining any benefits and good corporate governance. The MNC management of the ensuing hostility and resistance has tended to engender more violence and illegal appropriation of benefits. The economy of conflict in the Niger Delta resource conflict is an intervention by opportunists and merchants. It has resulted in a hijack of sort of the institutions of violence in the resistance of the region. In a sense, it has perverted the Niger Delta struggle.
