Riven by clan-based conflict, Somalia has been without an internationally recognised government since 1991. Providing rehabilitation and development assistance to such a politically fragile state has posed a major challenge to the international community. Since 1995 the European Union (EU) has been the largest donor and this report examines its political and development response to Somalia.
In all sectors other than food security and governance, the European Commission (EC) has been Somalia’s biggest provider of aid. Due to the prolonged absence of a central government, the EU has had to adapt the way it works. Financing agreements had to be adjusted before development funds could be released for Somalia. This demonstrates the rigidity of the EU’s legal frameworks, but also its willingness to take a flexible approach. The relative lack of strategic interest in the region and the weakness of the United Nations’ approach allowed the EC to play a dominant role in shaping international strategies and co-ordinating aid. However, the nature of its instruments and administrative procedures have sometimes proved a hindrance.
Securing development funds for Somalia led to the establishment of a temporary EC Somalia Unit in Nairobi and the appointment of a Special Envoy (1994-98). The funds have allowed the Commission to create adaptive and innovative programmes, but it has also met with challenges:
- Long programming cycles and administrative delays. These undermine its ability to work with and maximise positive, locally-driven development and political processes.
- Lack of transparency. Complex administrative procedures reduce the transparency of EC activities and damage trust with other donors and local actors.
- Lack of capacity and institutional memory. The Unit relied on external technical assistants in the field, but they were not legally mandated to represent the Commission and provided little feedback.
- Shortcomings in policy orientation, particularly the ‘peace dividend’ approach. Defining peace is complex, and judgements about disbursing aid based on this approach can lead to political and regional imbalances.
- Overlooking the importance of trade infrastructure and other macro-economic factors. A focus on human resources and governance can lead donors to neglect projects that are necessary for economic development.
- Inadequate accountability and transparency of donor interventions. The absence of government has resulted in asymmetric relationships with local actors and a poor sense of ownership of the development process.
Both the positive and negative experiences of the EU in Somalia suggest a number of ways to improve future responses. One key recommendation is for donors to analyse the political situation and integrate opportunities for conflict prevention and peace building into intervention strategies. The EU should also:
- Develop, with other donors, guiding principles and a strategic framework for the use of development resources.
- Develop, with other donors, modalities for relations with emerging and unrecognised authorities. The dangers of conferring legitimacy to illegitimate actors must also be recognised.
- Recognise, analyse and encourage positive political processes at both national and local levels.
- Improve the transparency of donor interventions and increase the involvement of local actors. Regular evaluations should be carried out, and information shared.
- Adapt instruments and programming to allow flexible responses to political and social developments. This includes funding a permanent presence, decentralising authority and simplifying administrative procedures.
- Increase the capacity of the country delegation to improve co-ordination among donors and local actors, as well as external communication and monitoring.
