How can Lebanon and its foreign allies strengthen the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) both as a local institution and as a stabilising force in the Middle East? This study argues that provision of funding and new equipment is urgently needed. Competing political actors within Lebanon must end their attempts to control or re-orient the LAF, and the LAF should communicate its policies and needs more clearly. In the light of threats from non-state actors within Lebanon such as Fatah Al-Islam, the present unique opportunity to develop the LAF must be vigorously pursued.
The LAF has enabled Lebanon to withstand the turbulence of the years following the withdrawal of Syrian troops in 2005. Pressures have included domestic and regional contests over the future of the country, assassinations of political and security figures, the Israel-Hizbullah war of 2006, terrorism and the remilitarisation of society. However, LAF force development over the 2005-2008 period does not reflect its increasingly important role in Lebanese and regional security.
The LAF has shown that it is one of the few Lebanese institutions trusted by a substantial cross-section of society. It has become more representative, more balanced and more capable as a fighting force. It is the only force capable of meeting the challenge from terrorist groups, Islamist or otherwise. Further findings are that:
- The Lebanese military faces asymmetric threats from non-state actors based in Lebanon. Left unchecked, the threat from groups like Fatah Al-Islam could destabilise both Lebanon and the region.
- Despite adhering to civilian leadership over the military, the LAF is willing to act independently to safeguard Lebanese national security interests. It has enough political capital to advise when possible and veto where necessary.
- LAF public diplomacy is unique to the Arab armies of the Middle East. However, the LAF remains largely opaque on matters relating to force development and policy changes.
- Largely due to the absence of a commonly agreed Lebanese national defence strategy, the LAF has to balance contradictory policies and positions concerning major local, regional and international players. Chief among these actors are Syria, Hizbullah, Israel and the U.S.
- The polarisation of Lebanese politics and efforts to control or re-orient the Lebanese military by competing political actors only serve to undermine the LAF’s effectiveness.
- U.S. policy towards the LAF is unclear, which damages U.S. efforts to bolster the LAF as a positive force in Lebanon and the region. The slow pace of U.S. military assistance, especially in the delivery of heavy weapons to the LAF, may be influenced by Israeli concerns that new weapons could fall into the hands of Hizbullah.
The Lebanese government needs to quickly provide the military with the one billion dollars necessary for essential force development. However, any attempt to strengthen the LAF so that it can fight Hizbullah will fail. Close to 30 percent of the officers corps is Shi’a, and given that the LAF is a reflection of Lebanese society, it cannot be ordered to act against a particular community. However, building up the LAF as a deterrent against Lebanon’s neighbours undermines Hizbullah’s logic regarding its weapons arsenal. Hizbullah disarmament should therefore be planned for the medium-to-long term rather than sought through fierce confrontation in the short-term.
- The LAF must integrate the lessons learned from the 2007 fight against Fatah Al-Islam. This entails developing an umbrella organisation to direct Lebanese special forces units; and ensuring better stocks of equipment and munitions, better combat communications and more training in marksmanship and artillery fires.
- The LAF should delineate more precisely its equipment needs, especially regarding close air support for combined ground operations. The publication of LAF white papers and reports on its doctrine and military needs would facilitate public debate.
- The LAF must contribute to shaping Lebanon’s national security imperatives. It would also benefit from expressing its concerns, interests and needs to international public policy institutions, in coordination with the Lebanese government.
