Interstate violence in Liberia has been fuelled by greed-driven and power-hungry faction leaders. Have such causes of conflict been adequately addressed? Or has the civil war been prolonged by inadequate peace accords?
This issue of Accord, a Conciliation Resources publication, charts the progress of conflict resolution in Liberia. Hostilities began in 1989 when the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) attempted to oust Liberia’s then dictator, President Doe. The retaliation and resultant war were brutal, with numerous massacres of civilians – often along ethnic lines, as the army and rebel movement each comprised rival ethnic groups.
The conflict has scarred society mentally and physically, and disrupted public and private business and development initiatives. Neighbouring states have felt the conflict’s impact, with over 800,000 refugees fleeing Liberia. Yet concerted efforts – producing 13 peace accords between 1990 and 1996 – failed to resolve the hostilities.
Peace accords will continue to fail unless they address the weaknesses inherent in previous failed talks and agreements. Armed groups use violence to gain political power and control of Liberia’s extensive and valuable natural resource base. A critical issue yet to be addressed is that faction leaders are unwilling to participate in peace-making activities for fear of losing the commercial benefits of conflict. The article argues that:
- Effective governance was suppressed because factional rivalry was not resolved when coalition governments were formed
- In seeking agreements between all sides, successive peace accords conceded ever more power to armed groups – squeezing out civilian authority and concern for civilians’ rights
- The number of armed factions increased as power-hungry individuals witnessed the accords ‘rewarding’ violent groups with a share of political power
- A lack of trust amongst rival factions impeded achievement of agreements satisfactory to all. Coordinating implementation of peace accords was further hampered by new factions (not committed to the accords) entering the conflict
- Peace-making initiatives by neighbouring states were obstructed by disagreement over priorities and each state’s historic and ethnic interest biases towards involved factions
- Citizens’ respect for religious leaders and the neutrality of the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee (IFMC) have been critical in encouraging and mediating dialogue between factions. It has also prevented religious disharmony escalating the conflict.
Accords will fail unless groups are serious about peace and combatants see incentives in disarming. Therefore, the key to future policy and reducing the violent rivalry over economic resources lies in developing alternative and equitable livelihood opportunities. Furthermore:
- These should be supported by international processes, such as arms and trade embargoes, to reduce profiteering from the ongoing conflict
- International efforts would do well supporting neutral civil groups and NGOs working towards peace without violence. Successful initiatives have involved persuading combatants to exchange guns for health care and education opportunities.
- Civil groups’ effectiveness in peace campaigning is enhanced if efforts are co-ordinated by a neutral umbrella organisation. There remains a role for international assistance to help such groups develop a national campaigning agenda
- Future accords must make provision for resolving disputes without them destabilising transitional coalition governments
- The Economic Community of West African States and other involved international organisations must have the capacity and the will to co-ordinate and strictly monitor implementation of peace agreements.
