How can the Afghan government and international supporters engage most effectively with non-state actors in community-based policing? The distinct characteristics and context of the Arbakai is an example of the diversity of armed non-state actors (ANSA) in Afghanistan. This diversity necessitates nuanced thinking about the role of and engagement with ANSA. There is a move to create or reinvent ANSA to help overcome Afghanistan’s security deficit. While a carefully considered plurality of security provision facilitated by the state is advisable, cooperation with ANSA should be limited to those which fill gaps in state provision rather than those which replace and challenge the state.
ANSA in Afghanistan include a wide range of groups (strongmen militia, Neo-Taliban insurgents, terrorist groups, criminal organisations, and community and customary structures) with varied goals. They have complex relationships with the state and with communities. Some Afghan ANSA challenge the state; some function independently of it; others establish para-state structures; and some hedge their bets. Despite this diversity, discussions often do not differentiate between distinct actors.
The arbakai have tried to fill gaps in state security provision and since 2001 have never challenged the state. They focus on keeping law and order in the Pashtun communities of Loya Paktia (Greater Paktia). Traditionally, each community is responsible for supporting its arbakai, but donors and the Afghan government have also paid for them to contribute to election security.
The strengths of the arbakai include their: links and (unusual) accountability to a community justice system; mobilisation and support from within the communities policed; limited jurisdiction (to home territory); and willingness to cooperate with the government. Limitations include: adherence to traditional laws that sometimes conflict with government and international norms; embeddedness in a specific, cohesive socio-cultural context; inability to withstand strong insurgency networks that co-opt communities; and a focus on small-scale problems within tribes.
- The arbakai are not a permanent body. Other ANSA, however, function after their initial aims are reached, and can cause security problems.
- The financing of most ANSA in Afghanistan tends now to be linked to their commander, even if they join other forces. Thus, individuals are loyal to a person rather than to a collective institution as in the case of the arbakai.
- The Afghan government lacks capacity to monitor its own security forces, let alone community-based policing structures.
- Government-ANSA cooperation can fundamentally change the nature of the ANSA or create distrust within communities.
Quick fixes to security deficits, especially when involving ANSA, can easily backfire. The long-term costs of arming militia to fight the Taliban may be too high. It might be more advisable to work with existing community structures such as the arbakai, and focus on providing governance and rule of law from the bottom up.
- The best approach may be for the state to function as facilitator and monitor in a formalised relationship. Arbakai would retain their autonomy and community linkages, but would receive some oversight.
- Policymakers should carefully analyse the specific characteristics and context of ANSA before designing engagement policies. A flexible, adaptable strategy of engagement with ANSA is likely to be more effective than transfer of set structures.
- It is important to understand the scope and mandate of ANSA in order to avoid pushing them beyond the limits of their capacities. Community-based police tend to be reluctant to become fighting forces.
- In terms of funding, it may be best to find ways of supporting entire communities in return for their contribution to security, in a mutually beneficial relationship.
- Communities should be clearly informed of the role and responsibility of any community-based police in relation to the state security forces, to manage unrealistic expectations.
