Have the UN integration reforms introduced between 1997 and 2007 increased efficiency and effectiveness in multidimensional peace operations? What are the barriers to better integration between UN agencies? This article from International Peacekeeping argues that the reforms have largely ignored the barriers to their implementation – such as the fragmentation of the UN structure and the complexity of war-to-peace transitions. Reform impact has been greatly diminished by the absence of accompanying incentives or effective organisational change backed by long-term political engagement and support.
The integration reforms were intended to create a strategic framework so that UN agencies could collaborate to produce a coherent support strategy during post-conflict peace operations. The first and second sets of reforms sought to consolidate and define mission leadership and centralise joint planning. The third set of reforms focused on facilitating field-level inter-agency programming and compacts between the UN and national governments. The final set of reforms attempted to improve internal integration, cooperation, and organisational culture in each UN development agency.
The reforms did not meet the efficiency goals of minimising duplication and optimising UN resources to meet the demands of missions. Neither did they meet the effectiveness goals to maximise the UN’s management of peace operations in a coherent and mutually supportive manner.
These failures are due to the lack of motivation for UN agencies to share resources and collaborate. Rare instances of success are the result of work by outstanding individuals. Additionally, the lack of guidelines for prioritisation, situational evaluation, interaction with non-UN partners, and institutional transformation makes the reforms unclear for field-level UN staff. Barriers to successful integration include:
- Fragmentation of the UN structure means that agencies differ in terms of operating procedures, accountability mechanisms, funding streams and operational mandates. This creates a barrier to communication and understanding between agencies.
- Contradictions may arise between the mandates and priorities of different UN agencies, such as between political, military and humanitarian imperatives. These are insufficiently discussed yet have significant implications for local populations.
- Top-down development of peace operation mandates involves little input from the field about feasibility or resource limits. The increasing detail of peace-operation mandates ignores the limited capacity of the in-country UN system.
- War to peace transitions are highly dynamic, complex endeavours with uncertain outcomes for which linear planning frameworks are inadequate.
- UN agencies perceive that integration would prevent them from fulfilling their individual mandate or would detract from their project funding.
The UN Secretary-General should take steps to modify and improve these reforms with support from UN member states. The following recommendations should be considered:
- Offer integrated funding for the UN system as a whole during peace operations.
- Develop an interagency group to develop future integration reforms and mechanisms to encourage compliance and accountability.
- Reform the administrative guidelines and business practices that block integration efforts.
- Create incentives within each agency, fund, programme, office and department for integration and collaboration.
- Encourage accountability for individual and collective agency impact on war-to-peace transitions.
